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ABSTRACT
Reelection-minded legislators look to participation to discern how potential
voters might react to a legislative vote. They rely on voting behavior, campaign con-
tributions, public opinion polls, and other forms of participation to inform their leg-
islative voting. Although members of Congress value this information, participation
is costly, particularly for racial and ethnic minorities, the poor and other resource-
constrained groups. Using formal theory and data on collective action events reported
in the New York Times from 1991 to 1995, I argue that collective action – partic-
ipation involving multiple participants publicly expressing a grievance or concern –
conveys to representatives the salience, or importance, of an issue to constituents.
Participants’ resource levels moderate this relationship. While, extant literature on
legislative behavior finds that Congress is more likely to reflect the preferences of white
and affluent constituents than their low resource counterparts, I make the counterin-
tuitive argument that following collective action legislators are often more likely to
represent the preferences of low resource collective action participants. This finding
is robust to the measurement of resources, the nature of collective action, the char-
acteristics of legislator and the congressional district, and the group’s organizational
resource capacity.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
“[P]rotest isn’t an exception to, departure from,
or repudiation of the political process,
it’s a part of the political process.”
- Richard Brody 2014 1
The verdict was rendered on April 29, 1992 around 3:15pm. Sergeant Stacey
Koon and Officers Laurence Powell, Timothy Wind, and Theodore Briseno were found
not guilty of assaulting Mr. Rodney King. The verdict angered many who viewed
the videotaped attack of the unarmed motorist as excessive. Within minutes, a large
crowd gathered outside of the Simi Valley, CA courthouse and over the next five days
the Los Angeles metropolitan area was teeming with assault, rioting, looting, arson
and even murder.
All over the nation people engage in collective action – non-electoral forms
of participation involving multiple participants publicly professing a desire for some
policy-related outcome (McAdam and Su, 2002). They gather for rallies, partici-
pate in letter-writing campaigns, join boycotts, and sign petitions to express their
grievances. While the Rodney King uprisings were underway, primarily in Los Ange-
les, New York City, and Chicago, collective action for other issues were occurring in
other parts of the country. In Birmingham, Alabama, 700 people marched in protest
1Retrieved on January 12, 2015 from http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-
comment/crucial-lessons-democracy-selma
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of the white supremacist activities of Neo-Nazis in their communities. In New York
City, Greenpeace activists were being arrested outside the United Nations following
acts of civil disobedience in opposition to environmental policies. At the same time,
a pro-life demonstration was occurring at an abortion clinic in Buffalo, New York.
Collective action events provide voice to the discontent. They also inform leg-
islative behavior (Gillion, 2013; McAdam and Su, 2002). To be sure, the congressional
response the Los Angeles riots was mixed but attentive. Democratic Congresswoman
Maxine Waters seized the opportunity to define the issues plaguing the mostly black
and Hispanic district she represents (Newman, May 19, 1992). She explained, “[The
problem] has been simmering because of a lack of attention to these inner cities for so
long. The hopelessness, the unemployment, the frustration has been festering. The
jury verdict was just the straw that broke the camel’s back”(qtd in Shuit, May 10,
1992). In contrast, representing the mostly white Simi Valley district, Republican
Congressman Elton Gallegly used the opportunity to introduce legislation addressing
illegal immigration. He argued, “A significant percentage of those who were rioting
and looting and participating in what we could accurately refer to as anarchy was
illegal aliens . . . It would be very hard to argue that their mission was to defend
Rodney King’s honor”(qtd in Sneiderman, May 8, 1992). Despite opposition by Con-
gressman Gallegly and almost forty percent of his colleagues, Congress passed the
Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 5132) to mitigate damages
in Los Angeles and other communities.
The differential responses by Congresswoman Waters and Congressman Gal-
legly to the collective action events surrounding the Rodney King incident demon-
strate that who is participating in a collective action event may be important for
understanding a legislator’s response to collective action. In this dissertation, I ar-
gue that the resources of collective action participants are pertinent to a legislator’s
determination of whether they should support their constituents’ issue preferences in
a roll call vote. I demonstrate that legislators are often more likely to support the
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preferences of lower resource constituents following collective action because legisla-
tors are interested in representing constituents demonstrating a willingness to hold
their legislator accountable for a vote on their salient issue preferences. This is true
regardless of the type of resource disparity, in spite of other characteristics of the col-
lective action event, and despite the characteristics of the legislator or congressional
district in which the collective action occurs.
The Politics of Representation
Legislators are generally more likely to favor affluent constituents over the
less affluent (Ellis, 2012; Gilens, 2012; Bartels, 2008). They are also more responsive
to white constituents than black or Latino constituents (Butler and Broockman, 2011;
Griffin and Newman, 2007). The biases in legislative behavior are largely due to the
incentives that motivate legislative behavior - party pressures, personal ambitions,
and constituency preferences.
Political parties are integral in helping legislators attain reelection by pro-
viding a brand name for representatives during elections and serving as a cartel that
facilitates coordination (Aldrich, 1995; Cox and McCubbins, 1993). As parties are
national coalitions of factions attempting to reach a consensus that benefits most
members of their respective coalitions (Bawn et al., 2012), they are less likely to ap-
peal to underrepresented groups (e.g., Griffin and Newman, 2008; Strolovitch, 2005;
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Furthermore, a lack of economic, racial, and gender
diversity among elected officials has led to policies that disadvantage the poor, racial
and ethnic minorities, and other lower resource groups (Carnes, 2012; Tate, 2004;
Hawkesworth, 2003).
Constituency preferences and the communication thereof also perpetuate leg-
islative biases in representation. Legislative behavior sometimes favors policies ben-
efitting the rich because of shared preferences between the rich and poor (Ura and
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Ellis, 2008) perhaps due to a lack of awareness among lower income constituents
about which policies best serve their interests (Bartels, 2005). Even when prefer-
ences between the groups differ significantly, minorities and lower income groups are
somewhat more diverse in their preferences than whites and higher income groups,
respectively, which makes the consistent representation of the former more difficult
(Clifford, 2012).
Not only are constituency and legislators’ preferences biased towards higher
resourced groups, but they are also biased against lower resourced groups. Support
for economically liberal policies is lower among affluent constituents (Page, Bartels
and Seawright, 2013; Gilens, 2012) and means-tested programs are criticized by work-
ing and middle-class whites for providing undeserving benefits to racial and ethnic
minorities (Gilens, 2000). Concurrently, Republicans are openly hostile towards race-
targeted policies designed to assist racial and ethnic minorities and Democrats make
concerted efforts to avoid being seen as beholden to racial and ethnic minorities’
interests (Edsall and Edsall, 1991).
Disparate participation rates are also blamed for the unequal representation
of sub-constituencies. Given the reelection incentive, legislators represent groups who
have the power to impose electoral penalties in the absence of responsiveness (Arnold,
1990; Fiorina, 1977). They often look to participation levels among subsets of their
constituency to determine which constituents are most likely to reward or punish the
legislator for their behavior and they are most likely to represent the concerns of
constituents with the resources to make frequent, informed contact (Grossman, 2012;
Miler, 2007). However, volunteering for a campaign demands time. Contributing to
a candidate requires income. Even voting can be a scheduling nightmare for someone
with odd working hours, multiple jobs, inadequate transportation, or scarce childcare
alternatives. A group’s resource capacity determines whether individuals who desire
to voice their concerns can feasibly do so through electoral participation.
Racial and ethnic minorities are generally less likely to participate electorally
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than white constituents (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). On average, blacks
have much less income, education, and occupational prestige than whites (Leighley
and Nagler, 2014). Facing similar socioeconomic impediments, a substantial popu-
lation of Latinos face obstacles relating to citizenship status, English-language profi-
ciency, and a lack of familiarity with the American political culture leading to lower
levels of participation among Latinos compared to demographically equivalent blacks
and non-Hispanic whites (Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010). Even more, a lack of orga-
nizational resources can exasperate demographic resource disparities.
People are more likely to participate politically when asked to do so (Gerber
and Green, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). But, the people who do the asking
- political parties, candidates who run for office, and elected officials - tend to target
previous voters, former contributors, and individuals easily accessible through social
networks (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). As a result, the political marginalization of
lower resource groups is compounded: those with fewer resources face greater barriers
to participation due to their lower socioeconomic status and political organizations
known to mobilize participation rarely target those with fewer resources.
When barriers to electoral participation are sufficiently prohibitive, collec-
tive action can be a viable option for groups wishing to communicate their concerns.
Unlike forms of participation that must take place around election cycles, collective
action can occur at almost any time and in almost any place. Collective action also ne-
cessitates less political knowledge about who to contact or how to make such contact.
This is especially appealing for less educated constituents or those disconnected from
organizations that relay information pertinent for electoral participation. Further-
more, collective action is a natural option for groups with a tradition of engaging in
social movements (Ganz, 2009). To be sure, minorities are more likely than whites to
engage in protest relative to doing nothing or contributing to political organizations,
and the poor are no less likely to protest than they are to contribute to campaigns
(McVeigh and Smith, 1999; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Still, while racial
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and ethnic minorities and the poor are more likely to engage in collective action than
white and affluent constituents, collective action is an option for any group of individ-
uals that identifies as a social group, perceives an unjust disadvantage, and believes
that they can do something about that injustice (van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears,
2008; Gamson, 1992).
For legislators interested in thwarting potential Election Day swings in their
opponents’ favor, collective action can serve as a valuable political resource even
when the primary goal of collective action is not to influence legislative behavior
(Kollman, 1998; Lohmann, 1993). For example, employment strikes intended to en-
courage corporations to increase minimum wages or improve workplace conditions are
not politically focused and do not directly target elected officials. They can, however,
inform a legislator with constituents engaging in collective action about the saliency
(or importance) of preferences for labor and employment practices in ways that are
not immediately observable in other forms of participation.
Salience is essential for legislative responsiveness. Legislative behavior is more
likely to represent constituency preferences when the issue is salient to constituents
(c.f. Canes-Wrone, 2001; Kollman, 1998; Kingdon, 1977) perhaps because constituents
electorally punish or reward legislators for their roll call votes on salient legislation
(Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010).
Legislators know that the salience level participants have for an issue is not
likely to reflect the salience, or even the preferences, of all constituents within the dis-
trict but rather a subset of constituents with similar preferences to the participants.
However, the fear of negative electoral repercussions by previously inactive partici-
pants motivates legislators to be responsive to collective action. Certainly, “latent
or unfocused opinions can quickly be transformed into intense and very real opinions
with enormous political repercussions” (Arnold, 1990, p. 68). Even infrequent politi-
cal participants can hold their legislators accountable should they shift their behavior
at an opportune time (Miller and Stokes, 1963). Individuals that participate in social
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movements and collective action are more likely to participate electorally (Rosenstone
and Hansen, 1993). As a result, legislative support for participants’ issues is likely to
shift when constituents are active within the legislator’s district (Bailey, Mummolo
and Noel, 2012). This is true even when the majority of other voters disagree with
the collective claims made during demonstrations (Lohmann, 1994).
Extant literature demonstrates that collective action provides elected officials
with valuable information about the direction and strength of the policy preferences
of their constituents (e.g., Gillion, 2013; McAdam and Su, 2002; Cress and Snow,
2000; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Gamson, 1975; Lipsky, 1968). Legislators are likely
to reward this participation with representation if they are confident that the partic-
ipants care enough about the issue to affect the legislator’s probability of reelection.
I argue that resource levels of collective action participants help legislators to discern
whether the issue that mobilized the group is truly salient for participants.
Data
Several datasets are used to examine the role of resources and non-electoral
participation on legislative behavior. The majority of the data is from the Dynamics of
Collective Action (DCA) dataset (McAdam and Su, 2002). The DCA is a compilation
of all collective action events reported in the New York Times from 1960 to 1995.
The DCA includes a plethora of information on the nature and frequency of collective
action and has been used extensively in analyzing the relationship between collective
action and government responsiveness (for examples, see Gillion, 2013; Olzak and
Soule, 2009; McAdam and Su, 2002).
The DCA data for this analysis is confined to 1991 to 1995 to examine the
most recent collective action events available in the DCA. This period excludes the
unique decades of heightened collective action and social movement activity in the
United States and subsequently allows for conjectures about the political implications
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of more recent collective action. The dependent variable measures legislative support
for collective action on the first roll call vote following the collective action event but
during the same congressional session. Therefore, the overall analysis is based on
legislative responsiveness from 1991 to 1996 (i.e., the 102nd, 103rd and 104th Con-
gresses). The period of analysis for this research has variability in the composition of
each Congress, which provides for greater generalizability of the findings. The 102nd
Congress has a Democratic majority under a Republican president, while the Demo-
cratic party retains control of Congress under a Democratic president in the 103rd
Congress and loses its majority in the 104th Congress under the same Democratic
president. Partisan control has implications for the types of issues that legislators will
have the opportunity to vote on and the strategies they employ when voting (Peress,
2013; Whitby, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Indeed, a legislator is more likely
to defect from voting with his party when his party is in the minority than when it
is in the majority (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Whitby, 1997).
The DCA includes a wealth of information concerning the characteristics of
initiating groups including occupation, race, ethnicity, age, gender, and residency
status. This data is used to develop the primary independent variables in subsequent
chapters. Coders also listed the names of up to four interest groups mentioned as
being present at each collective action event. These names were the basis of a novel
dataset of organizational resource capacity employed in Chapter V.
Using GIS software, I identify the legislator representing collective action
participants by locating the congressional districts that overlap with the cities in
which each event in the DCA occurs. Analyses are conducted for the issue area with
the most frequent collective action claims in the DCA for 1991 to 1995: the Policy
Agenda’s Project classification of Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties.
Only events reported in the New York Times are included in the DCA, which
means that there is greater coverage of events transpiring in a major city or having
a national focus relative to smaller collective action events. Consequently, while
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this data provides for an adequate test of the theory and includes information on
hundreds of collective action events, the empirical analysis is limited to relatively
visible collective action.
The geographic limitations of the data may have consequences for the em-
pirical findings. Legislators representing districts in or near major cities may differ
in their legislative behavior in response to collective action. In Chapter IV, I explore
how diverse districts and legislator characteristics might influence legislative behav-
ior. The theoretical and empirical findings suggest that some legislators have more
incentive than others to respond to collective action participants. Still, all legislators
should be at least as likely to represent the preferences of low resource collective action
participants as they are to represent high resource collective action participants. Leg-
islative behavior in response to collective action events not included in DCA should
be similar to responsiveness revealed in the empirical analyses in this dissertation.
Relative to less visible collective action, events with greater news coverage
have the potential to increase the scope of the conflict and increase pressures on
legislative behavior that are external to the communication between legislators and
collective action participants. While an empirical analysis of this selection bias is not
conducted in this dissertation, the theory delineated in Chapter II suggests that the
visibility of the event should not alter legislative responsiveness to collective action.
According to the theory, legislators respond to collective action because they are
responding to a group that is communicating through collective action a willingness
and ability to hold legislators accountable for their legislative behavior. Empirically,
I address influences on legislative responsiveness that are external to collective action
with a variety of variables known to influence legislative voting.
I supplement the DCA data with several datasets concerning the characteris-
tics of the district the collective action event occurs in and the legislator representing
that district. The first of these data is the replication dataset from the the Paradox
of Replication (Lublin, 1997). This data provides information on the 87th-104th con-
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gressional districts including the districts’ level of education, median family income,
percent voting age black and Latino populations; and the legislators’ party, length of
service, race, and gender. The legislator’s Margin of Victory in the previous election
is attained from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection (CQ Press, 2015). I
used United States’ Census Bureau data to determine whether the district is located
in a southern state.
Census Bureau data, along with American National Election Study Post-
election Surveys, was also useful in creating a measure of the district’s level of public
salience for Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties through the multi-
level regression and post-stratification (MRP) method. This Public Salience variable
measures the salience of an issue for constituents in a district in order to discern
whether legislators are responding to the salience of collective action participants
or to the salience of other constituents in a district. MRP produces an estimate of
district level opinion from national survey data (Warshaw and Rodden, 2012; Lax
and Phillips, 2009). Specifically, for each of the 1992, 1994, and 1996 American
National Election Study Post-Election Surveys, I partially pooled survey responses
across districts for the survey question indicating whether respondents believed that
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties is one of the top three most impor-
tant problems facing the nation. Using the glmer package in R, the individual survey
responses are estimated with a hierarchal model of the binary dependent variable
(whether civil rights issues is one of the most important problems facing the nation)
as a function of individual characteristics (race, age, income, survey), district, dis-
trict characteristics (income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent urban), region,
state, and state characteristics (veteran population). The estimates are poststratified
using breakdowns of congressional district demographics by race, age, and income.2
The MRP process culminates in a measure of the percentage of the district that be-
2Population estimates are obtained from the 1990 Decennial Summary File 3 and accessible via
the United States Census Bureau’s DataFerret tool.
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lieves that Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties is one of the top three
most important problems facing the nation for each of the 102nd, 103rd, and 104th
Congresses.
Finally, I create a measure of a legislator’s voting record relative to other
legislators in each Congress on Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties
issues using Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997)
and the wnominate package in R. This measure of Relative Voting Record generates
ideal points for each legislator based on how liberal or conservative the legislator’s
voting record is relative to other members in Congress. Together, this data on district
and legislator characteristics helps to assess whether any legislative bias that exists
in response to collective action is due to the resources of the participants or to other
legislative considerations.
Overview of Chapters
In the next chapter, I present a formal theory evaluating a situation in which
groups of disparate resource capacities signal to legislators through their collective
action that an issue is salient and therefore advantageous to support. This theory
suggests that because groups with fewer resources communicate their interests less
often than higher resource groups (because barriers to participation are more pro-
hibitive for those with fewer resources), reelection-minded legislators are more likely
to discount collective action by higher resource groups and reward collective action
by lower resource groups.
In Chapter III, I empirically evaluate implications of the theory using con-
gressional roll call votes and data from the Dynamics of Collective Action dataset
on collective action events reported in the New York Times from 1991 to 1995. I
measure resources according to the economic, demographic, organizational, and tac-
tical resources of the group. That is, I compare poor versus nonpoor participants,
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nonwhite versus white participants, collective action without a formal interest group
versus collective action with a formal interest group, and extra-institutional versus
institutional tactics.3 While many investigations into legislative behavior find a con-
sistent bias favoring white and affluent constituents over racial and ethnic minorities
and middle or lower income constituents, I make the counterintuitive argument that
legislators, at least following collective action, favor low resource groups over their
high resource counterparts following collective action.
Furthermore, I analyze whether other characteristics of the collective action
event alter the relationship between the resources of collective action participants
and legislative behavior. It could be that legislators appear more likely to respond
to the interests of collective action by lower resource groups because those groups
engage in collective action that is larger, more disruptive, or more likely to be covered
more often by the New York Times. With few exceptions, the bias advantaging the
disadvantaged remains even when considering other characteristics of the collective
action event.
Chapter IV considers whether the theory of legislative bias and subsequent
empirical validation of that theory are applicable beyond the average legislator. Ex-
tending Fiorina (1974)’s formal theory of sub-constituency influence, I argue that
legislators who are less secure in their reelection prospects will demonstrate a greater
bias towards lower resource groups than more electorally secure legislators. Con-
sidering the distinctive relationship between race and representation in the US and
the differential treatment of black citizens by the Media, public, and police, I focus
specifically on the representation of black and white collective action participants.
Because of the disadvantages faced by black collective action participants,
their costlier collective action induces electorally insecure legislators to be more likely
to represent their preferences than the preferences of their white counterparts. New
3Extra-institutional tactics include allies, marches, riots, civil disobedience, mob violencedemon-
strations, vigils, pickets, strikes, boycotts, and symbolic displays. Institutional tactics include peti-
tions, letter-writing campaigns, lobbying, press conferences, and organization formation.
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legislators, nonblack Democrats, and legislators with smaller electoral margins of vic-
tory are consistently more likely to support preferences raised during collective action
when the participants are black than when the participants are white. Relative to
their congressional counterparts, these legislators also demonstrate a larger difference
in voting behavior in favor of black collective action participants’ interests.
While senior legislators and legislators with large electoral margins of victory
are more confident in their reelection prospects than new legislators and those with
small electoral margins of victory, respectively, they still demonstrate a greater pro-
clivity to represent black relative to white collective action participants. Conversely,
Republicans and black Democrats demonstrate no statistically significant difference
in their legislative voting behavior in response to black and white collective action
participants. Republicans have little incentive to represent the mostly liberal claims
raised during collective action, regardless of the race of the collective action partici-
pants. On the other hand, black Democrats are the most liberal in their voting be-
havior on Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties. They are therefore more
likely than than their congressional counterparts to already be representing collective
action participants’ preferences. This is particularly true for the representation of
black collective action participants’ preferences since black Democrats are more likely
than other legislators to have preferences that align with black constituents. Conse-
quently, the empirical results support that all legislators should be at least as likely
to represent the interests of black collective action participants as they are to support
the preferences of white collective action participants.
The purpose of Chapter V is to gain a more nuanced understanding of the
influence of organizational resource capacities on legislative behavior. In Chapter III,
I investigate organizational resource capacities by comparing collective action with an
interest group to collective action without an interest group. Yet, even among interest
groups, there is variation in resource capacities. I compare four types of groups.
First is collective action by groups with no formal interest group mentioned
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at the event. These groups represent predominantly grassroots efforts. The lack of
any formal leadership experienced in generating collective action suggests that these
groups have the least resources of all group types explored. Chapters II and III
suggests that these costlier, grassroots efforts should be more likely than collective
action by any interest group to receive legislative support following collective action.
Next is collective action by organizing interest groups. These groups are
defined by the leaderships’ focus on building their members’ efficacy and capacity
to be active participants in the direction and governance of the interest group. The
crucial resource of organizing interest groups is their members’ active participation.
Then, there is collective action by mobilizing interest groups that focus more
on developing a large membership for sporadic engagements than they do on build-
ing the capacity of their members. The primary resources of mobilizing interest
groups are their budgets, large memberships, and professional staff. Mobilizing inter-
est groups, like the American Political Science Association (APSA), are most likely
to be businesses, professional organizations, and other financially secure groups with
members of greater income, education, and professional networks. These groups have
the highest resource capacity.
Last is collective action by interest groups with both organizing and mo-
bilizing capacities. Examples of organizing and mobilizing interest groups include
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the
AARP. These interest groups necessarily supplement the lobbying efforts made pos-
sible by their mobilizing capacity with active membership engagement representative
of their organizing capacity.
In allowing for variation among groups, the analyses demonstrate that the in-
fluence of organizational resources on collective action is indeed nuanced. The theory
of legislative bias proposes that low resource groups should be more likely than high
resource groups to receive legislative support for their interests following collective
action. By implication, collective action without a formal interest group should be
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most likely to receive legislative support for their interests following collective action.
However, legislators are most likely to lend legislative support for the preferences of
interest groups with any organizing capacity. There appears to be little difference
between interest groups only with organizing capacity and interest groups with orga-
nizing and mobilizing capacities. Interest groups that only have mobilizing capacity
are substantially less likely than all of their counterparts, including groups lacking the
experience of a formal interest group, to gain legislative support following collective
action.
Chapter IV provides support for the theory of legislative bias in that a low
resource group is more likely than mobilizing only groups to gain legislative support
following collective action. However, the lowest resource group is not the most likely of
all groups to gain legislative support. The results imply that legislators are interested
in representing the salience of their constituents but that they are also looking for a
credible signal. The willingness of individuals to engage in time- and labor-intensive
participation provides some credibility, which is evident by the lower likelihood of
legislative support for mobilizing only groups. Credibility is also imparted by interest
groups with organizing capacity due to their ability to effectively communicate the
preferences of collective action participants.
I conclude the dissertation by considering the generalizability of the empirical
results and contemplate how this study comports with existing research on the rela-
tionship between constituency preferences and legislative behavior. This discussion
introduces new data on collective action in 2012. Comparing the novel data with
the data in the Dynamics of Collective Action dataset reveals that the frequency and
nature of collective action in the early 1990s may not differ much from recent col-
lective action. One major difference is in the greater use of the Internet. However,
legislators are most likely to respond to costly participation. So when any method
of collective action becomes convenient, the influence of the communication on leg-
islative responsiveness diminishes. Given this data, the formal theory of legislative
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bias, and empirical findings throughout this work, the advantage of disadvantage in
legislative responsiveness to collective action is expected to extend through the 21st
century.
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CHAPTER II
A Formal Theory of Legislative Bias
Collective action can provide negative inducements for legislators to engage
in bargaining (McAdam and Su, 2002; Gamson, 1975; Lipsky, 1968) that benefits
constituents. Indeed, mobilization by homeless organizations is effective in influencing
local officials (Cress and Snow, 2000) and antiwar protests during the Vietnam War
positively shifted congressional voting behavior (McAdam and Su, 2002). In a more
comprehensive study, Gillion (2013) finds that collective action leads to responsive
legislative behavior, at least with respect to the influence of collective action for
minority interests. What remains unresolved is how the influence of collective action
varies across the resource levels of participants.
In this dissertation, I ask whether the resources of collective action partici-
pants alters how a legislator votes on issues raised during collective action. To answer
this question, I develop a formal theory based on the canonical signaling model. The
model is beneficial in its ability to ascertain the logical implications of the strategic
interaction between two actors with asymmetric information.
I begin delineating the formal theory with a discussion of the motivations
and goals of two actors: (1) a legislator desiring to represent the salient interests of
constituents and (2) a group signaling their interests through costly participation. I
then explain what information each actor has about their counterpart and when that
information is available to each actor. Next, I discuss what actions are available to the
group and legislator. The actors must determine how to respond to each other given
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their own constraints and what they know about their counterpart. As collective
action is more costly for some participants than for others, the model includes a
consideration of the resource capacity of the group. I focus on formal and informal
interest groups. This theory does not preclude the presence of a formal interest group
as mobilizers, but it also does not require the presence of such an organization. I
contend that the presence of a formal interest group is a signal of participants’ resource
capacity. Finally, I describe a set of conditions under which resources determine the
legislative response to collective action participants.
The implications of the model suggest that as the resource level of the group
decreases, the likelihood that the legislator will support the group’s preferences in-
creases. For lower resource groups that face greater obstacles to participation, col-
lective action presents new information to the legislator about the saliency of their
concerns. Collective action adds to the information that the legislator has already
received from higher resource groups during elections, volunteer work, campaign con-
tributions, and other participation.
Actors
As in traditional signaling models, there exists a sender with private informa-
tion about the state of the world, and a receiver who takes an action that influences
both players’ payoffs. In this model, the sender is a group, G, and the receiver is a
legislator, L. Both the group and legislator possess common knowledge about certain
aspects of the issue, such as the distribution of preferences for or against the policy.
However, the group has private information about the legislator’s constituents. The
private information concerns the group’s type, t, where t ∈ {l, h}. The group knows
how important, or salient, the issue is among the legislator’s constituents, but the
legislator does not have this information. A high type group (Gt=h) has members
who belong to the legislator’s constituency who possess high salience for the policy
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in question. A low type group (Gt=l), on the other hand, contains participants who
place little importance on the policy’s realization. In this game, the receiver places
a probability, λ, on the belief that the sender is a high type, and, 1 − λ, on the
prior belief that the sender is a low type. Both players are aware of this probability.
The group’s type is determined exogenously by nature or some player or event not
involved in this interaction.
Actions
The group moves first in the signaling game. It decides whether or not to
engage in collective action – the relevant signal of this model. Even though the group’s
decision to engage in collective action may not be motivated by their legislator’s
responsiveness, the group prefers an outcome in which the legislator supports its
policy interests. Nevertheless, collective action is costly. The group prefers to get
this outcome without having to send any signal. The group will send the signal
(engage in collective action) if it expects that the payoffs of performing such action
will outweigh the payoffs of inaction.
After the group moves, the legislator takes an action a ∈ {y, n}. With
this action, the legislator informs the group whether she is supporting the group’s
policy preference. The legislator would prefer to support a group that provides her
with more electoral support without discouraging existing support. Since groups
with high salience for an issue are more likely to base their electoral participation
on the legislator’s representation of their preference on that issue, she would prefer
to support a high salience interest group over a low salience group. What makes
this decision interesting is that the legislator does not know whether a high or low
salience interest group is engaging in collective action as salience and participation
are not perfectly correlated with one another. Higher levels of salience increase the
probability of collective action. But, in some situations groups with lower levels of
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salience engage in collective action. In other situations those with high levels of issue
salience fail to act upon their concerns. To navigate this quandary, the legislator
updates her beliefs about the group’s salience for the issue once she observes the
group’s (in)action. These posterior beliefs are also common knowledge.
Group’s Utility
The group only receives value from policy support when the group is inter-
ested in the realization of a policy goal, or when it has high salience for the issue
(Gt=h). Perhaps a low salience type group engages in collective action because it
is fun or because of some social benefit from participation but, by definition, a low
salience type group does not engage in collective action because they are highly in-
terested in the realization of the policy goal. Moreover, positive value is only possible
should the legislator choose to legislatively support the group (a=y). When a=n, the
group receives no utility from engaging in collective action. Even when legislative
support is likely and important for the group, the cost of engaging in collective action
could be prohibitive for participation. Consequently, the utility that the group re-
ceives from engaging in collective action is a function of the expected value obtained
from legislative support and the costs of pursuing the action (CˆA) as follows:
UG = at− CˆA(Cr)
Notice that the cost component of the utility function also includes a con-
sideration for the resource levels of the participant, Cr. The utility implies that
collective action will occur when the value of policy support is greater than the costs
of participating in collective action. When Cr=l, the costs of engaging in collective
action are sufficiently high to prevent participation. This cost decreases as interest
group resources increase. While there are still costs to participation for high resource
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groups (Cr=h), the costs are low enough that they are virtually nonexistent.
Legislator’s Utility
When choosing how to respond to collective action, the legislator considers
the consequences of each of her actions. When the group’s salience is high (Gt=h),
she receives a positive payoff for supporting the group (a=y) and no payoff if she
does not support the group. Choosing to support a group may result in an elec-
toral gain, but this decision is also costly. This cost, k, could arise from writing and
implementing legislation, convincing others to adopt the group’s policy position, sup-
porting one group instead of another group, or any other type of support that results
in the legislator expending resources on behalf of the group. This cost is particularly
high when participants’ issue preferences diverge from other legislative considerations
(party pressures, constituency preferences, or the legislator’s personal preferences).
The legislator has the following utility function:
UL = a(t− k)
A legislator will support a group if the expected utility of supporting the group is
greater than the expected utility of not supporting the group. Observe that it is
possible for a legislator to support a group even if that group chooses not to engage
in collective action as support is not conditional on a legislator having received a
collective action signal but on the expected utility of each of her actions.
Theoretical Expectations
This signaling model gives insight as to when collective action is likely and
the conditions under which a legislator might support collective action by groups with
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disparate resource levels. Solving the theoretical model for perfect Bayesian equilibria
leads to several testable predictions.
To assess how legislators respond to collective action by groups of disparate
resource capacities, I explore the equilibrium in which a group always engages in
collective action when salience for the issue is sufficiently high (Gt=h) but engages
in collective action with probability α when salience is low (Gt=l). High resource
capacity groups can engage in collective action regardless of the group’s salience level
for the issue because the costs for collective action are not prohibitive. However, for
low resource groups, collective action is only possible when salience is high enough
to mitigate the costs of participation. In this equilibrium, the legislator supports a
group in response to collective action with probability γ but never supports a group
if it fails to engage in collective action. Given the legislator’s electoral considerations
(party pressures, constituency preferences, or the legislator’s personal preferences),
it is unlikely that a legislator will always support a group that engages in collective
action, which is why the legislator supports a collective action group with probability
γ. The assumption that a legislator will never support a group that does not engage
in collective action is also unlikely; but this assumption is sufficient in its ability
to make predictions concerning the likelihood of legislative support given collective
action.
The complete equilibrium is available in the Appendix. Of particular interest
is the proof sustaining the group’s strategy (probability(CA|Gt=h) = 1), which is
conditional on the relationship between a legislator’s decision to support a group after
seeing a collective action event conveying information about the group’s salience level
for an issue (known only to the group) and the group’s resource capacity (common
knowledge to all actors). When group resources are high, the legislator supports a
group after seeing collective action with some probability (γ ≥ 0). But, when groups
have low resource capacity to overcome the prohibitively high costs for collective
action legislators are always likely to support a group after observing collective action
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(γ = 1). This yields the Resource Constraint Hypothesis :
A legislator is more likely to support collective action by constituents with low
resource capacity compared to similar collective action by constituents with
high resource capacity.
This expectation is different from conventional views of legislative behavior
that establish a bias benefitting higher resource groups. Collective action provides an
opportunity for politically disengaged populations to communicate their preferences
as salience for an issue rises. That resource constrained groups are able to overcome
participation barriers and stage comparable collective efforts as their higher resourced
counterparts suggests to legislators that the issue inciting the collective action is truly
salient for the lower resource participants. Furthermore, participants with higher re-
source capacities face fewer barriers to traditional forms of participation. As such,
they are more likely than their lower resource counterparts to already be communi-
cating their preferences and the salience of those preferences to their elected officials.
In other words, collective action by higher resource groups only adds to the amount
of information legislators already have about the salience of groups facing lower bar-
riers to participation whereas collective action by lower resource groups provides an
occasion for legislators to become informed about and respond to the strength and
direction of the preferences of infrequent electoral participants.
The benefits of collective action by lower resource groups are not lost on ob-
servers. Recognizing the strength of collective action by the politically marginalized,
well-financed organizations sometimes subsidize participation to give the appearance
of grassroots efforts (Walker, 2009). For example, Americans for Prosperity, a po-
litical organization funded by wealthy conservative businessmen Charles and David
Koch, was reported as masquerading as a grassroots organization marching against
policies like Medicaid expansion and the Environmental Protection Agency in effort
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to entice legislative support for their interests.1 Whether the organization success-
fully misrepresented the resource and salience levels of collective action participants
is unknown, but this example does demonstrate that efforts to conceal resource levels
could be strategically beneficial.
To summarize, I use a formal model to determine the conditions under which
legislators will respond to groups of disparate resource capacity. I argue that leg-
islators will reward collective action (even when not politically focused) by lower
resource groups and place lower value on participation by higher resource groups. If
a reelection-minded legislator is concerned that a previously silent group with salient
interests could influence her reelection and if that legislator is concerned that not all
collective action participants have salient concerns for the issue, then she will refer
to the resource capacity of the participants. Lower resource, politically marginalized
groups may actually care more about the issue when they are able to overcome greater
barriers to participation for similar collective action efforts. Additionally, higher re-
source groups, who are more likely to participate electorally because they do not face
as many participation barriers, communicate their preferences and the intensity of
those preferences more often to legislators in other forms of participation. In short,
for higher resource groups there are diminishing returns associated with diversify-
ing their participation with collective action. Consequently, legislators will be more
likely to respond favorably to collective action by groups that face greater barriers to
participation.
In subsequent chapters, I empirically evaluate the theory of legislative bias.
The analyses are conducted at the national level and focus on the legislative behavior
of members of the U.S. House of Representatives in response to collective action
by constituents within their districts. Nonetheless, this theory of legislative bias
1See, for instance, this Al Jazeera America article connecting the Koch brothers to
Americans for Prosperity’s grassroots efforts against Medicaid expansion and other poli-
cies: retrieved December 14, 2014 from http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/12/
colorado-kochtopusamericansprosperity.html
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is applicable to any reelection-minded legislator after a careful consideration of the
political environment to determine the relevant resource groups.
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CHAPTER III
Assessing Legislative Bias to Collective
Action
Responsiveness
In this investigation, I seek to uncover legislators’ responsiveness, or the de-
gree to which representatives’ behavior changes following a change in constituency
behavior (Achen, 1978). While legislators perform many actions that constitute re-
sponsiveness (e.g. the amendment process (e.g., Whitby, 1997), committee oversight
(Minta, 2011), constituency service (Butler and Broockman, 2011)), I focus on leg-
islative responsiveness revealed through roll call voting behavior.
Roll call voting is essential to lawmaking. More importantly for this inves-
tigation, roll call votes facilitate position-taking and provide opportunities for con-
stituents to monitor or become aware of legislative behavior. It is the recognition
that constituents will vote against a legislator once they are made aware of a roll call
vote that incites legislators to be strategic in casting roll call votes (Ansolabehere
and Jones, 2010; Hutchings, 2003; Arnold, 1990). Notwithstanding, various dynamics
undermine the purity of roll call votes as a measure of representation.
Negative agenda control dictates that political parties will disallow issues
on the agenda that will potentially divide or hurt the party (Cox and McCubbins,
1993). Consequently, issues important to collective action participants may not be
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reflected in legislators’ roll call voting behavior because the opportunity to represent
constituents’ interests does not present itself. Even when the opportunity arises, a
yea or nay on a roll call vote tells us little about a legislator’s intensity of preferences
for an issue or the legislator’s prioritization of those issues (Hall, 1996). Legislators’
intensity or prioritization of constituency preferences is more likely to be revealed
through constituency service, the sponsorship of legislation, the length or frequency of
speeches, or other legislative behaviors. With a roll call vote, the level of support from
a legislator with intense preferences may appear equivalent to a legislator that has only
tepid preferences for the issues. At the same time, a legislator who regularly votes in
support of an issue would not appear responsive to collective action participants who
share a policy interest because she would have supported the issue even if collective
action had not occurred.
That there is a significant relationship between collective action and legisla-
tive behavior during strategic voting suggests that representation following collective
action might be stronger using a different measure of legislative behavior capable
of revealing true preferences. However, this investigation does not seek to discover
whether legislators prefer to support collective action participants but whether legis-
lators’ behavior responds more favorably to collective action participants with fewer
resources. This is why roll call voting presents a good, yet conservative test of legis-
lators’ responsiveness.
True preferences are also concealed if a legislator prefers to support a group
on a roll call vote, but party leaders entice her to cast an alternative vote in effort
to advance the interests of the party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). The likelihood of
party pressure varies with the type of roll call vote. Procedural roll call votes are the
most likely to be subject to pressures that entice members to vote with their party
(Crespin, 2010; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Members of Congress are given more
freedom on amendment and final passage roll call votes but there is large variation in
whether legislative votes on amendments will be controlled by party leaders (Jenkins,
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Crespin and Carson, 2005; Whitby, 1997). Some amendments, like the Social Security
Amendments of 1965, which established Medicaid and Medicare, are highly visible
and not likely to be subject to party pressures, but others are inundated with party
line votes. The degree of partisan control makes procedural and amendment roll call
votes inferior measures of legislators’ responsiveness to collective action participants
because legislators are less able to vote with their constituents, particularly when
constituent interests diverge with partisan interests. Therefore, I only include final
passage roll call votes in the analyses.
The responsiveness measure used in this analysis is an indicator of support
for the preferences of collective action participants based on the specific nature of
the claim expressed during the event as follows: First, the specific claim, or concern,
of each collective action event as detailed in the DCA is extracted. The claim may
concern specific legislation; but, it more frequently relates to a general policy or issue.
For example, several collective action events transpired for the seventh observance of
the national Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday on January 20, 1992. Most of these
events were to commemorate the deceased civil rights leader and to protest violence.
Others were initiated by participants promoting white supremacy and racism.
Once the specific claim for each event is identified, I search www.govtrack.us,
an online database of all legislation presented before the House of Representatives,
for the first final passage roll call vote on an issue relevant to the claims of the
participants. The vote must also occur before the end of the congressional session.
Next, the roll call vote cast by the legislator representing the district(s) in which
the event occurred is recorded. The dependent variable, Support, is then created
as a dichotomous variable indicating whether a legislator supports the interests of
collective action participants based on the claims of those participants and the roll
call vote of the legislator. A legislator Supports, or is responsive to, collective action
participants if she votes in support of the claims specified during a collective action
event in the first final passage roll call vote occurring after the event and before the
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next congressional election. For the preceding example, a yea vote on H.R. 5678 (a
bill that appropriates funds for the MLK commission) supports Martin Luther King,
Jr. commemorators, while a nay vote aligns with the interests of white supremacists.
Admittedly, legislators consider a number of factors when choosing how to vote –
only one of which is collective action. While a yea vote corresponds to the interests of
one group and a nay vote to those of another, the vote could be determined in spite
of those interests; opposition to H.R. 5678 might occur because a legislator opposes
government-funded holidays in principle and not because they wish to support white
supremacists. Additionally, the decision to vote could be responsive to the interests
of collective action participants but not to the collective action event itself. The
theory does not require that collective action occurs for legislators to be responsive
to the salient preferences of sub-constituencies; only that legislators consider the
salience of sub-constituencies when casting a vote. Collective action eases legislators’
consideration of salience levels.
Resources
The primary goal of this investigation is to uncover how resources influence
representation induced by collective action. Individuals with lower socioeconomic
status, racial and ethnic minorities, and those with lower organizational capacity face
higher barriers to participation than their counterparts. The DCA includes several
measures that relate to these resources.
I measure socioeconomic status with Poor Participants, a variable denoting
whether the participants are poor (low-income or homeless) or not. I measure demo-
graphic resources with the variable, Nonwhite Participants, which compares racial or
ethnic minorities to white participants. Organizational capacity is measured with a
binary variable that indicates whether an organized interest group is present, where
No Interest Group Present is the lower resource group. Finally, I measure socioeco-
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nomic status with an indirect measure indicating whether the form of collective action
is institutional or extra-institutional, where Extra-Institutional Tactics suggest a re-
source disadvantage. Based on the disaggregation of tactics used in Olzak and Soule
(2009), institutional tactics include: petitions, letter-writing campaigns, lobbying,
press conferences, and organization formation. These tactics require higher levels
of education about how to perform these actions and to whom the actions should
be targeted. Additionally, the capacity to engage in institutional forms of collective
action is acquired or socialized in white-collar occupations and social networks that
are less accessible to lower resource groups. The category for extra-institutional tac-
tics involves more disruptive protests, like rallies, marches, riots, civil disobedience
and mob violence. Extra-institutional tactics also include: demonstrations, vigils,
pickets, strikes, boycotts, and symbolic displays. As each of the resource variables
are overlapping but distinct concepts of resource capacity, I examine the variables
as the primary independent variable in four separate models. Furthermore, the high
resource group is the reference category in each resource variable.
Other Legislative Considerations
A legislator is responsive to collective action participants of disparate re-
source capacities if the vote differs from a vote that would have been cast in the
absence of collective action. Empirically, this means that there must be a significant
difference in legislative support for groups of disparate resource capacities even when
considering other factors that typically influence legislative behavior. In addition to
collective action, legislators consider their own electoral incentives and the legislating
costs they may incur in choosing to support a group’s interests. I include multiple
control variables in the empirical model to account for these alternative explanations
of congressional voting behavior.
Constituency preferences have been attributed to many legislative voting be-
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havior decisions including those that contribute to legislative bias (e.g., Ura and Ellis,
2008; Bartels, 2008). As participation and representation do not occur in a vacuum,
it could be that legislators are responsive to collective action participants’ preferences
because of shifting salience levels among observant publics. Consequently, I create
a measure of district-level Public Salience using multilevel regression and poststrat-
ification (MRP) (Warshaw and Rodden, 2012; Lax and Phillips, 2009). For each of
the 1992, 1994, and 1996 American National Election Study Post-Election Surveys,
I partially pooled survey responses across districts for the survey question indicating
whether respondents believed that Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties
is one of the top three most important problems facing the nation. I model indi-
vidual survey responses as a function of demographic and geographic characteristics
and then poststratify (weight) the estimates by the percentages of each demographic-
geographic type in the actual district population.
The characteristics of the district are also important in explaining the effects
of constituency preferences on legislative behavior. As Education and Income are
widely held determinants of participation, they are also informative for legislators
seeking to represent the political preferences of their constituents. Constituents with
higher levels of formal education are more economically conservative than those with
lower educational attainment, except for the most educated who are more liberal than
those with only a college degree. Additionally, as education levels increase, support
for socially liberal policies increases (c.f McCall and Manza, 2011). Relatedly, affluent
constituents are more socially liberal but economically conservative than the rest of
the American population (Page, Bartels and Seawright, 2013; Gilens, 2012).
Another recognized measure of constituents’ preferences is the racial or ethnic
composition of the district: the greater the percentage of minorities in a district, the
greater the incentives for legislators to support minority interests (Hutchings, 1998;
Lublin, 1997; Whitby, 1997). Consequently, Percent Black and Percent Latino are
included in the models to represent the largest racial and ethnic minority groups in
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the United States.
Beyond the characteristics of the district in explaining legislative behavior
are characteristics of the legislator. A legislator’s political party is a well-known
indicator of how a legislator will vote on legislation. Democrats are, ceteris paribus,
more liberal than Republicans on roll call votes (Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008;
Hutchings, 1998; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Subsequently, I include Democratic
Representative as a variable in the model to account for the effects of political party
on legislative decision making.
An equally well-known indicator of how legislators vote on a specific bill is how
they vote on other bills (Jackson and Kingdon, 1992). A measure of voting history, or
Relative Voting Record, on all minority issue area roll call votes by each legislator in
each Congress is developed using Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE scores (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1997).1 This is a measure of how liberal or conservative a legislator’s roll
call voting is on minority issue area roll call votes relative to other legislators within
the same Congress. The use of voting behavior as a measure of voting behavior
has encountered criticism for providing inconsistent estimates (Poole and Rosenthal,
1997) and for being tautological (Jackson and Kingdon, 1992). But this variable is
necessary for demonstrating that the current vote in support or against collective
action participants’ interests is attributable to the saliency of the issue and not to
other factors that influence voting. Finding a statistically significant coefficient on
the resources variable suggests that the actual influence of collective action may be
stronger than indicated by the coefficient as both Democratic Representative (Fiorina,
1974) and Relative Voting Record (Jackson and Kingdon, 1992) make it difficult to
uncover the influence of collective action.
Additionally, a legislator’s Length of Service is likely to explain legislative
voting behavior. The greater the length of service the less susceptible a legislator is
to district pressures. Compared to new legislators, Incumbent legislators are better
1A list of Minority Issue Areas is available in the Appendix.
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known in their districts, and they are more knowledgeable about which constituent
concerns are imperative to their reelection goals (Fiorina, 1977; Mayhew, 1974; King-
don, 1977; Fenno, 1973). Then again, the smaller the Margin of Victory the more
susceptible members are to constituency pressures (Fiorina, 1977; Mayhew, 1974;
Fenno, 1973).2
While legislators are concerned with reelection, they also have their own pol-
icy goals that they desire to pursue (Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Fiorina, 1974; Kingdon,
1977; Fenno, 1973). Minority representatives tend to vote more liberally than white,
male representatives (Tate, 2004; Lublin, 1997; Whitby, 1997). These individual char-
acteristics not only influence the voting behavior of legislators through preferences
but also through their ability to legislate (Hawkesworth, 2003). So, I include Black
Representative, Latino Representative and Female Representative variables. South-
ern legislators are less likely to support policies benefiting racial and ethnic minorities
than other legislators. This is true even among Democrats (Hutchings, 1998). South-
ern State, as defined by the US Census Bureau, is therefore another important variable
explaining legislative voting behavior.
Empirical Model
In the 102-104th Congress, there are 652 unique collective action events with
claims within the Civil Rights, Minority Issues, or Civil Liberties major topic classi-
fication. For 528 (81%) of those events, the members of the House of Representatives
voted on at least one bill addressing the issue raised during collective action. Recall
that only the first final passage roll call vote in the House of Representatives that
occurs following a collective action event and before the end of the 102nd Congress
2The Margin of Victory variable is attained from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection
(CQ Press, 2015).
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is included in the analysis.3 After merging the events with the congressional districts
that overlap with the event location mentioned in the New York Times, 4,855 obser-
vations remain for the analysis. The increase in observations results from the fact
that some of these events occur in multiple locations, while others occur in big cities,
like New York, where multiple members of Congress govern. Since participants may
protest in Manhattan, but live in Brooklyn, it is likely that any member of Congress
representing a district in New York could find the event informative for how his or
her constituents will react to a roll call vote on an issue important to participants.
So, all districts, and subsequently their respective representatives, overlapping a city
are included in the analysis.
This empirical study measures the voting behavior of members of Congress in
response to collective action in their respective districts. The unit of analysis is a roll
call vote by a legislator on an issue raised by his or her constituents during a collective
action event. The roll call vote follows the collective action event occurring within
the same Congress - either the 102nd Congress, 103rd Congress, or 104th Congress.
As maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is the most common method for analyz-
ing binary choice models (Greene, 2008), I employ a MLE logistic regression with
congressional district fixed effects.4 An effects model specification is employed to ad-
dress legislative behavior in peculiar congressional districts. A Hausman test reveals
that the fixed effect model specification is more appropriate than a random effects
specification because the unobserved variance term appears to be correlated with the
independent terms.5 The size, direction, and levels of significance for the primary
independent variables measuring the resources of collective action participants are
robust to fixed effects and random effects model specifications. The coefficient size is
slightly larger and significance level smaller for the pooled regression but a likelihood
3While there may have been more roll call votes addressing the collective action participants’
concerns following the first vote, only 20 roll call votes fit these criteria.
4I use the logit command in STATA for the fixed effects model.
5Hausman test evaluates the consistency of an estimator when compared to an alternative, less
efficient, estimator which is already known to be consistent.
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ratio test reveals that both effects model specifications are more appropriate than the
OLS model specification.6
Resources and Legislative Bias
This empirical analysis addresses the following counterfactual: had the re-
source level of collective action participants been different (high resource participants
instead of low resource participants), would the legislative response to collective ac-
tion have remained the same? The Resource Constraint Hypothesis proposes that
disparate resource capacities leads to legislative responsiveness that favors lower re-
source constituents. The results in Table 3.1 suggest the same. In fact, in all models
the lower resource groups are advantaged over higher resource groups in legislators’
responsiveness to collective action for Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Lib-
erties issues. As seen in Figure 3.1, poor participants are 35% more likely to gain
legislative support following collective action than non-poor participants. Both non-
white and grassroots collective action efforts are 13% more likely than their higher
resource counterparts to gain legislative support. And, extra-institutional tactics are
almost 20% more likely to gain legislative support than institutional tactics. These
legislative biases are all statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
6Robustness checks of the model specification are provided in the Appendix.
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Table 3.1: Resources and Legislative Support
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Poor Participants 1.514∗∗∗ 0
(0.550) (.)
Nonwhite Participants 0.538∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.138)
No Interest Group Present 0.562∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.0782) (0.0937)
Extra-Institutional Tactics 0.786∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.120)
Public Salience −2.614∗∗∗ −2.605∗∗∗ −2.452∗∗∗ −1.388∗ −1.249
(0.581) (0.587) (0.582) (0.766) (0.778)
Education −0.282 −0.269 −0.440 −1.151 −1.304∗
(0.654) (0.656) (0.659) (0.765) (0.776)
Income 1.697∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 2.064∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.552) (0.551) (0.645) (0.659)
Percent Black −2.044 −2.110 −1.867 −1.852 −1.866
(1.496) (1.505) (1.507) (1.757) (1.786)
Percent Latino −0.399 −0.866 −0.213 −1.666 −2.230
(1.856) (1.863) (1.867) (2.154) (2.191)
Democratic Representative 1.126∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 0.897∗ 0.966∗∗
(0.387) (0.389) (0.389) (0.472) (0.479)
Relative Voting Record −0.907 −0.987 −0.731 −0.0331 0.0690
(0.769) (0.771) (0.773) (0.929) (0.940)
Length of Service 0.348 0.445 0.200 −0.165 −0.266
(0.634) (0.634) (0.643) (0.734) (0.752)
Incumbent −0.631∗∗∗ −0.715∗∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗ −0.595∗∗
(0.190) (0.191) (0.191) (0.227) (0.233)
Margin of Victory 0.984 0.943 1.044∗ 0.510 0.433
(0.614) (0.614) (0.620) (0.711) (0.720)
Black Representative 0.088 0.081 −0.000 0.132 0.096
(0.616) (0.619) (0.621) (0.721) (0.733)
Latino Representative 0.277 0.290 0.189 0.419 0.394
(0.649) (0.651) (0.653) (0.755) (0.767)
Female Representative 0.343 0.357 0.351 0.313 0.335
(0.316) (0.318) (0.318) (0.373) (0.379)
Southern State −4.240∗∗ −4.361∗∗ −3.865∗∗ −1.211 −1.666
(1.764) (1.764) (1.776) (1.880) (1.879)
Constant −0.721 −0.421 −1.189 −0.682 −0.527
(1.553) (1.555) (1.570) (1.626) (1.612)
Congressional District Dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 4855 4855 4840 3073 3058
Log likelihood −2499.2 −2492.5 −2469.7 −1838.9 −1804.0
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Model V in Table 3.1 includes all resource variables, except for poor partic-
ipants due to a lack of variation in that variable.7 The full model reveals coefficients
similar in size and significance levels to the previous four models, which suggests that
each resource variable is measuring different types of resource capacity but with sim-
ilar implications for the likelihood of legislative support. In other words, no matter
how resource capacity is measured, lower resource groups are more likely than higher
resource groups to gain legislative support from collective action efforts. The results
hold even controlling for other indicators of legislative voting behavior.
Figure 3.1: Resources and Legislative Support (Models I-IV)
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All covariates are held at their means.
Controlling for indicators of legislative behavior beyond collective action helps
to answer whether legislators would have voted in support of participants’ claim even
if the collective action had not occurred. Table 3.1 shows similar influences from dis-
trict and legislative pressures for each model of collective action participants’ resource
capacity. Generally, the controls included in the model help to predict legislative be-
havior either fail to meet conventional levels of statistical significance or they are
7Less than 1% of New York Times articles mentioning collective action events reference poor
participants. Only a small fraction of that 1% of events also contained other collective action group
characteristics.
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consistent with expectations. The exception is for district-level public salience.8 The
more constituents in a district who believe Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil
Liberties is one of the most important problems facing the nation, the less likely a
legislator will vote in line with collective action participants’ interests. Part of this
relationship may be driven by the public’s general disapproval of collective action,
which is often viewed as disruptive or illegitimate even when the collective action is
nonviolent (Page and Shapiro, 1992). Collective action may increase public salience
for an issue while also decreasing issue support because the public generally disap-
proves of collective action or thinks that it is ineffective in producing policy change
(Herrnson and Weldon, 2014). Notwithstanding, the existence of these other legisla-
tive considerations in the models of legislative behavior demonstrates that legislators
are likely responding to the collective action by constituents in their districts even as
they consider other factors that influence their behavior.
Alternative Explanations
As I argue that resource disparities serve as a proxy of participants’ true
salience levels when legislators are considering the potency of collective action partic-
ipants’ concerns, an adequate test must compare equal levels of collective action by
high and low resource groups. That is, if most of the collective action by nonwhite
constituents consists of thousands of participants while collective action by white
constituents is done by the dozens, then the fact that legislators are more responsive
to nonwhite collective action participants compared to white participants could be a
function of the size of the event rather than the resource capacity of participants. It
could be that legislators are less concerned about the resource levels or participants
and are primarily concerned about the salience revealed by other measures of collec-
8The empirical results are generally consistent when the MRP Public Salience measure is excluded
from the analyses (See Table C.5 in the Appendix).
38
tive action when determining how likely their roll call vote will influence the next
election.
Figures 3.2 - 3.4 are representative of the relationships between resources,
other salience indicators, and legislative support.9 Figure 3.2 displays the difference
in the probability of legislative support of collective action without an organized
interest group present compared to collective action with an organized interest group.
It shows that legislators are equally likely to support low resource groups as high
resource groups when the event is relatively small. However, when the size of the
event increases to around 50 to 100 persons, the relationship revealed by the formal
theory and initial empirical analysis is supported - low resource collective action
participants are more likely than higher resource participants to receive legislative
support for their preferences. This bias remains until the event contains over 10,000
participants - at this point, the legislator likely infers that any collective action that
large is likely to represent a substantial group with truly salient interests in the issue
raised during collective action.
The legislative advantage for low resource groups also holds when measur-
ing demographic and tactical resources (see Figure 3.2). When examining tactical
resources, the difference in legislative support is once again statistically significant
for moderately sized events, but when the event contains hundreds of participants,
differences in levels of support are relatively small. However, when almost no one is en-
gaging in collective action, legislators are generally less supportive of unconventional
participation, like marches and boycotts, than they are of petitions, letter-writing
campaigns, and other more conventional forms of collective action. At only one point
are legislators generally biased towards higher resource groups and that is when ex-
tremely small groups engage in protest. Generally, however, legislators are more likely
9Resource by salience marginal effects plots for poor participants are not performed. It is not
feasible to execute resource by salience interactions for the poor (vs non-poor) participants measure
of resource capacity as less than 1% of New York Times articles mentioning collective action events
reference poor participants.
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Figure 3.2: Resources, Salience (Size), and Legislative Support
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Note: Each graph displays the difference in predicted probability of legislative support of low resource
groups relative to high resource groups at different sizes of the collective action event. All other
variables are held at their means.
to represent the interests of lower resource groups.
The disruptive politics literature identifies disruptive collective action (e.g.
property damage, arrests, injury, death, police, weapons) as indicators of salience
(Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Lipsky, 1968). The
literature is ambiguous as to whether disruptive collective action increases or decreases
support. The graphs in Figure 3.3 are similarly ambiguous. I define collective ac-
tion events as disruptive if they possess any of the following characteristics: property
damage, police presence, arrests, weapons, injuries, or death. When events by de-
mographic groups (racial and ethnic minorities compared to whites) are disruptive
the bias for lower resource groups is larger than when the events are less contentious.
When comparing organizational or tactical resources, the bias is largest in favor of
lower resource groups when the events are more contentious. Support for the Resource
Constraint Hypothesis is present in all analyses of disruptive collective action – low
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Figure 3.3: Resources, Salience (Disruptiveness), and Legislative Support
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Note: Each graph displays the difference in predicted probability of legislative support of low resource
groups relative to high resource groups for collective action events with no (the left bar) or at least
one (the right bar) disruptive characteristic. All other variables are held at their means.
resource groups are more likely than high resource groups to gain legislative support
following collective action regardless of whether the event is disruptive.
Finally, it could be that lower resource groups are more likely to gain leg-
islative support following collective action because their events receive more coverage
in the New York Times. While the New York Times is a proxy for collective action
events on legislators’ radar, the newspapers coverage of events could incite salience or
give a greater platform to events covered in the newspaper. Figure 3.4 demonstrates
that lower resource groups are generally more likely than higher resource groups to
gain legislative support regardless of the number of times the New York Times re-
ports on a collective action event. The exception is observed when comparing extra-
institutional to institutional tactics. Low resource groups are more likely than high
resource groups to gain legislative support in the majority of collective action events
(96%) that are only mentioned in one New York Times newspaper article; but, for
the rare (4%) coverage of collective action events by multiple New York Times news-
paper articles, legislative bias actually favors groups engaging in collective action
through institutional tactics (high resource group) compared to extra-institutional
tactics (low resource groups). The majority of that coverage relates to racial and
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Figure 3.4: Resources, Salience (Media Coverage), and Legislative Support
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Note: Each graph displays the difference in predicted probability of legislative support of low resource
groups relative to high resource groups for collective action events covered in one (the left bar) or
multiple (the right bar) New York Times articles. All other variables are held at their means.
ethnic tensions highlighted by the Rodney King and Crown Heights events in 1992.
Perhaps, the peculiar, polarizing nature of those racial and ethnic conflicts created cir-
cumstances in which legislators were forced to respond to higher resource collective
action participants. Notwithstanding, the Resource Constraint Hypothesis receives
mostly consistent support in the empirical analyses. Low resource groups are gen-
erally more likely than their higher resource counterparts to gain legislative support
following collective action even when considering other measures of salience.
On Collective Action as Informative Participation
Collective action is a political resource by which constituents may commu-
nicate their concerns to legislators (Gillion, 2013; Kollman, 1998; Lohmann, 1993).
It provides an informative signal to legislators concerning the direction and intensity
of constituents’ opinion beyond what information is available by way of conventional
forms of participation. Although collective action is rare, it is beneficial in its ability
to occur at any time and in any place. Electoral participation, on the other hand, is
constrained by campaign timelines and political occasion. With collective action, cit-
izens are not compelled to wait for Election Day to hold their legislators accountable.
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Furthermore, legislators are able to look beyond campaign contributions and public
opinion to collective action in gauging constituent satisfaction. While public opinion
is informative of sentiments about issues survey designers deem important, collec-
tive action is able to relay information about unforeseen and potentially electorally
detrimental constituent concerns.
This investigation measures the legislative bias in responsiveness to collective
action participants using roll call votes. Previous research exploring legislative bias
demonstrates that under normal circumstances high resource groups are more likely
than their lower resource counterparts to be represented by their elected officials. But,
there are exceptions to that rule. In this work, I demonstrate that protests are most
effective in altering legislative behavior when performed by the most marginalized
populations. To be sure, the discussion of other salience variables suggest that par-
ticipants’ resource levels are as important, if not more important, than measures in
previous analyses used to explain responsiveness to protest behavior. Even more, the
design of the empirical model measures responsiveness to collective action beyond the
average legislator’s normal behavior, which tends to support policies favoring higher
resource groups. The analyses demonstrate that the legislators that are reluctant to
support collective action participants’ claims are most likely to be responsive to col-
lective action participants. If legislators consistently support lower resource collective
action participants in response to consistent constituency preferences, political pref-
erences, or their own personal incentives, then the coefficient on the resource variables
would never be statistically significant (e.g., Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Fiorina,
1974). I explore this point further in the next chapter by looking beyond the average
legislator.
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CHAPTER IV
The Electoral Context and Legislative
Bias in Response to Collective Action by
Black and White Participants
One of many benefits of collective action is in its ability to allow constituents
to communicate their salient interests to their elected officials. While legislators can
discern constituency preferences by attuning to voting behavior, public opinion polls
or other electoral participation, salience, or the intensity of constituency preferences,
is more easily discernible through collective action (Kollman, 1998). For any partic-
ipant, collective action is a costly endeavor. It takes time, coordination, transporta-
tion, and other resources that are critical for lower resource groups. Black collective
action participants, particularly when compared to their white counterparts, face
additional costs relating to the portrayal of blacks as deviant members of society.
The overrepresentation of blacks as criminals in news coverage has led to
an increase in support for punitive policies (Gilliam and lyengar, 2000), including
the policing of minority collective action participants. Even when controlling for
the size and disruptiveness of collective action, police presence and action (arrests,
force, and/or violence) are often more likely at collective action events featuring black
participants than events that feature white participants (Davenport, Soule and Arm-
strong, 2011). Beyond the increased threat of physical abuse or a criminal record,
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the framing of event participants is also consequential for the desire and ability of
blacks to pursue collective action. Mainstream media often misrepresent black col-
lective action, particularly when events diverge from conventional, white narratives
(Davenport, 2010). Still, it is the costliness of collective action that makes legislators
more likely to respond to black collective action participants relative to their white
counterparts. Costly collective action communicates to a legislator that an issue is so
important to the group that it is willing to overcome potentially prohibitive partici-
pation barriers. Consequently, a legislator is generally more likely to represent black
collective action participants (who face greater barriers to participation) than their
higher resourced, white collective action constituents. The theoretical and empirical
findings in this chapter support that legislators are at least as likely to support the
interests of black relative to white collective action participants, regardless of the
legislator’s race, party, or the competitiveness of the congressional district.
I begin by briefly discussing extant literature on constituency preferences and
legislative behavior. In this discussion, I review how the electoral context – including
the competitiveness of the district and the legislator’s race and party – may influence
how a legislator votes on legislation. I then present a modification of Fiorina (1974)’s
theory of sub-constituency influence to demonstrate how legislative bias in response
to collective action participants might reveal itself in different electoral contexts. I
focus specifically on the representation of black relative to white constituents and find
empirical support for this contention.
This work supports the Resource Constraint Hypothesis, which suggests that
legislators are more likely to respond to collective action by lower resource groups
who face greater barriers to engage in costly participation. A legislator’s electoral
context varies the strength but not the direction of legislative behavior in response
to collective action by groups of disparate resource capacities. Because of the disad-
vantages faced by black collective action participants, their costlier collective action
leads to legislative behavior that is at least as likely to represent the interests of black
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collective action participants as it is to represent the interests of white collective ac-
tion participants. This research has important implications for scholarship on the
representation of black constituents and on legislative bias.
Constituency Preferences and Legislative Behavior
When we talk about legislative representation (or the lack thereof) of con-
stituencies, Fenno (1978) advises that we should be cognizant of which constituencies
legislators are or are not representing. Representation of group interests depends on
whether a legislator expects a group to impose future repercussions for legislative
behavior in opposition to the group’s preferences (Arnold, 1990; Fiorina, 1977). In
general, these groups tend to be attentive publics with the resources to consistently
communicate their interests and to support legislators through financial contributions
(Miler, 2007). Constituents with greater levels of education, income, and occupational
prestige tend to participate more often than those with lower socioeconomic status
(Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Verba et al., 1993; Verba and Nie, 1972; Schlozman and
Tierney, 1986). Participation by racial and ethnic minorities is greater in districts
with minority representation (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990), when minorities have higher
levels of trust and efficacy (Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Soss, 1999; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990)
or when they are asked to participate (Philpot, Shaw and McGowen, 2009).
Furthermore, participation and accordingly representation are higher when
the issue is salient to the group (Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010; Hutchings, 1998).
This is particularly true when legislative behavior is easily observable. While leg-
islators can pursue their true preferences in oversight hearings, floor speeches, and
other less observable legislative behavior, it is in easily observable behaviors, like
final roll call voting, that legislators strategically respond to salient constituent inter-
ests that diverge from what legislators desire to do in office (Hutchings, McClerking
and Charles, 2004; Hall, 1996; Fiorina, 1977). How strategic a legislator must be in
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responding to particular constituency preferences depends on the electoral context.
Fiorina (1974) classifies two distinctive representative types: maximizers and
maintainers. The distinction between the two relates to how much each type of leg-
islator is likely to be beholden to her reelection constituency (Fenno, 1978). Vote
maximizers seek to enlarge their probability of reelection by voting almost exclu-
sively with their reelection constituency. They do so because they are uncertain
about who their loyal supporters will be, they are overly ambitious, or they have
non-conflicting personal goals (Fiorina, 1974). On the latter, if legislators have per-
sonal policy preferences that align with their homogenous district’s preferences, their
personal preferences reflect those of their party, and they are influential members of
the party with great prestige, then they are likely to behave as vote maximizers. This
is true even if their goal is not to maximize their probability of reelection as a vote
cast to maximize the probability of reelection is observationally equivalent to a vote
cast in line with party and personal preferences for a legislator with non-conflicting
personal goals.
Legislators representing heterogenous constituencies also behave as vote max-
imizers. In heterogeneous districts, or in districts with conflicting opinions, any vote
has the potential to alienate those in the reelection constituency, or those in a district
who a legislator believes will vote for her (Fenno, 1978). This is particularly true when
Democrats represent districts with racially conservative whites and racially liberal
blacks. In these districts, electoral insecurity leads to less stable legislative support
of black interests, especially on low profile roll call votes (Hutchings, McClerking and
Charles, 2004). Notwithstanding, electoral insecurity is what makes legislators most
responsive to the preferences of black collective action participants relative to their
higher resource counterparts because legislators are apprehensive about the conse-
quential electoral participation of a voting block with salient concerns.
Voting decisions are less complicated for legislators as constituency prefer-
ences within a district converge, such as when districts are racially and ideologically
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homogenous. In these districts, a legislator’s reelection concerns are less constrain-
ing so long as she votes with the median voter in the district (Gerber and Lewis,
2004). At least this is the case for final passage votes, which are less susceptible to
party pressures than procedural votes (Crespin, 2010). Indeed, maintainers engage
in a mixed strategy of representing their reelection constituency on some votes and
representing other interests that misalign with those of the reelection constituency
on other votes (Fiorina, 1974). As legislators seek to cast votes that garner enough
support from sub-constituencies to win reelection, even if only by a small margin,
they can abandon their reelection constituency in efforts to secure other goals, like
greater prestige, making good public policy, or having greater influence within their
respective parties.
Electoral context is important when determining how legislators will respond
to collective action by different groups. Some legislators are more sensitive to the
salient demands of constituents than others, but as the theory below will demon-
strate, even as legislators vary in the degree of pressure they encounter from their
party, their constituents, and their own personal goals, the electoral context influ-
ences the degree but not the direction of legislative bias in favor of lower resource
groups (in this case, black participants) relative to higher resource groups (white
collective action participants). All legislators are at least marginally more likely to
respond to lower resource collective action participants relative to equal levels of col-
lective action by higher resource participants because lower resource participants face
greater participation costs relating to their lower socioeconomic statuses (Leighley
and Vedlitz, 1999) or the stigmatization of certain issues by dominant communities
(see, for instance Gilens, 2012; Strolovitch, 2005; Cohen, 1999) or a number of other
factors.
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Refining the Theory of Legislative Bias
Fiorina (1974) defines constituency groups by their level of strength and care
for an issue. Strength is defined as the ability of a group to punish or reward a
legislator’s behavior using time, money, political knowledge and other resources that
facilitate participation in both non-electoral and electoral participation. Groups can
reveal their strength in their levels of collective action by way of having more partic-
ipants or longer duration.
Care relates to the subjective assessment by a legislator of a group’s proba-
bility of becoming concerned about her vote during the next election (Fiorina, 1974).
When groups care more about an issue, they demonstrate more strength than their
typical participation might predict. That is, when groups with fewer resources have
high levels of salience for an issue they are able to overcome the constraints that
typically inhibit their participation. Legislators gauge salience by paying attention
to current levels of salience and predicting how those salience levels may fluctuate
over time. Salience revealed through collective action coupled with a legislator’s cur-
rent estimation of a group’s resource levels update a legislator’s belief concerning
the sub-constituency’s level of care for an issue. Similar levels of participation by
groups of disparate resource capacities demonstrates that lower resource groups are
able to overcome participation barriers (because of higher levels of existing salience)
to demonstrate an equal ability to reward or punish a legislator in the next elec-
tion. Consequently, lower resource groups have greater care for an issue than higher
resource groups at equal levels of revealed salience, or strength.
Using the assumptions established in (Fiorina, 1974), I develop expectations
concerning the legislative behavior of maximizing and maintaining representatives in
response to collective action by two groups of equal strength but different levels of
care concerning an issue. Indeed, while (Fiorina, 1974) explores several legislative
scenarios to develop expectations concerning sub-constituency influence on legislative
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behavior, this particular case was not explored in that seminal work.
Table 4.1: Summary of Key Terms
Term Definition
Strength the ability of a group to punish or reward a legislator’s behavior
Care the subjective assessment by a legislator of a group’s probability of becoming
concerned about her vote during the next election
p subjective estimate of legislator’s current probability of reelection
p∗ legislator’s minimum acceptable subjective probability of reelection
Gj a group within the legislator’s district who the legislators believes is concerned
about an issue
cjk legislator’s subjective probability that her vote on issue, k, will mobilize group Gj
xjk the expected increase in p resulting from a legislator’s vote with Gj’s preferences
on issue k
zjk the expected decrease in p resulting from a legislator’s vote against Gj’s
preferences on issue k
Sjk strength of Gj on issue k such that Sjk = xjk + zjk
Maximizer a legislator who votes in order to maximize p
Maintainer a legislator who votes in effort to maintain p
Q, 1−Q weights assigned to a maintaining legislator’s strategy to produce no expected
change in p
a1 a legislator’s expected outcome of voting with G1, a group or set of groups taking
a particular position on an issue
a2 a legislator’s expected outcome of voting with G2, a group or set of groups taking
a position in opposition to G1’s preferences on an issue
As established in (Fiorina, 1974), suppose that there is a reelection-minded
legislator. The legislator places a subjective estimate, p, on her current probability of
reelection. This legislator also has a minimum acceptable subjective probability of re-
election, p∗. Assume that p is within the interval [p∗, 1], and 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ 1. Additionally,
assume that to change p the legislator alters her behavior in consideration of a group,
Gj, within her district who she believes is potentially concerned about an issue. The
legislator places a subjective estimate, cjk, of the probability that her vote on issue,
k, will mobilize group Gj. In addition, the legislator considers the relative strength,
Sjk, of group Gj on issue k, which is the sum of the group’s ability to reward, xjk,
or punish, zjk, the legislator’s behavior during an election (Sjk = xjk + zjk). The
negative consequence of group Gj’s ability to punish the legislator is greater than
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the ability of the group to positively reward her (zjk ≥ xjk ≥ 0). Consequently, the
legislator’s beliefs about Gj lead to p+ xjk if she votes with the preferences of Gj on
issue k, and p − zjk if she votes against the preferences of Gj on issue k. As a final
note, assume that x ≤ 1− p and z ≤ p so that the legislator’s subjective estimate of
her current probability of reelection, p, remains between 0 and 1.
The decision to support Gj is also based on the relationship between p and
p∗, and the aspirations of legislator. Vote maximizers are legislators for whom their
subjective estimate of the probability of reelection is less than their minimum accept-
able subjective probability of reelection (p < p∗), p∗ is uncertain, p∗ = 1, or their
reelection goals align with other goals such that even a vote that does not attempt to
maximize p inevitably results in an increase in p. As long as any of these conditions
exist a legislator will attempt to maximize p.
A legislator can also behave to maintain p. Vote maintainers are those for
whom the estimated probability of reelection exceeds the desired threshold concerning
their perceived reelection probabilities (p > p∗). When p∗ < p ≤ 1, a legislator assigns
weights (Q, 1−Q, where 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1) to the expected utility of voting for or against
issue k (and the group(s) concerned about k) in order to produce no expected change
in p. Vote maintaining legislators tend to represent safe or homogenous districts and
face little competition among groups in their district. Table 4.1 summarizes these
terms and definitions for easier reference.
With those assumptions in place, assume that a representative believes that
two groups of equal strength care about an issue but that the groups’ preferences
conflict. The legislator’s voting decision, as displayed in Fiorina (1974), is depicted
in Table 4.2.
At this point, I depart from Fiorina (1974)’s theory of sub-constituency in-
fluence to explore a legislator’s decision-making when faced with two groups of equal
strength with differing preferences but where one group cares more than the other.
In other words, S1 = S2 and c1 > c2 > 0. I begin with the following proposition:
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Table 4.2: Voting Decision Given a Two-Group Conflictual Constituency
State
Strategy
(Probability)
G1G2 G1 G2 G1G2 G1 G2
c1c2 c1(1− c2) (1− c1)c2 (1− c1)(1− c2)
with G1 x1 − z2 x1 −z2 0
against G1 −z1 + x2 −z1 x2 0
Vote Maximizing Strategy: Following collective action, vote maximizing leg-
islators are more likely to support collective action participants with lower
resources than they are to support higher resource collective action partici-
pants.
Proof
For the maximizer, a1 is the expected utility from voting with G1. It equals c1x1−c2z2.
The legislator’s expected utility of voting with G2 is a2 = c2x2 − c1z1. Therefore,
Ul(a1) > Ul(a2)
c1x1 − c2z2 > c2x2 − c1z1
c1(x1 + z1) > c2(x2 + z2)
c1(S1) > c2(S2)
By assumption, S1 = S2. Therefore, c1 > c2. 
In this case, a maximizer will always support G1 (the group that cares more
about the issue). This support may not always result in a positive increase in the
legislator’s subjective estimate of her current probability of reelection, p. Even if G1
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cares more than G2 about the issue (c1 > c2) and the legislator’s expected benefit of
voting in support of G1 is greater than that of voting with G2 (Ul(a1) > Ul(a2)), it is
possible that any vote cast by the legislator will result in a decrease in the legislator’s
estimate of her current probability of reelection (Ul(a1) ≤ 0). This will happen if
G2 is willing and able to punish the legislator for her vote more than G1 is willing
and able to support the legislator for her support (x1 < z2). In other words, even
if the legislator’s support of the group she accurately perceives to care more about
an issue results in a higher electoral payoff than supporting the competing group’s
preferences, this strategy could still fail to result in the legislator’s reelection. The
legislator only gets an increase in her subjective estimate of her current probability
of reelection (Ul(a1) > 0) when the ability of the group that cares more about the
issue to reward the legislator’s behavior equals or exceeds the ability of the competing
group to punish the legislator (x1 ≥ z2 while c1 > c2).
The best strategy for all types of vote maximizers is to vote in line with the
group that cares the most – in this case, lower resource, black participants who engage
in collective action. Electorally insecure legislators, whose current probability of re-
election is less than a desired minimum threshold (p < p*), are legislators who do not
believe that they have enough votes to secure reelection. When legislators are elec-
torally insecure they are more responsive to constituency influences (Ansolabehere,
Brady and Fiorina, 1992). Higher levels of responsiveness to salient constituent in-
terests are also present among legislators whose minimum acceptable probability of
reelection (p*) is unknown. Fiorina (1974) suggests that legislators in this category
are those who are new to a congressional district. Greater levels of responsiveness to
salient constituency preferences is induced by these legislators’ lack of awareness con-
cerning who their loyal supporters are or the issues for which specific sub-constituents
will have salient concerns. When legislators’ minimum acceptable probability of re-
election is met only when reelection is certain (or, p∗ = 1), legislators will continuously
act to support the most salient concerns of their constituents. Finally, legislators with
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reelection goals that align with party pressures and personal goals will consistently
vote for policies that align with salient constituency preferences.
While vote maximizing legislators desire to maximize their current proba-
bility of reelection, vote maintaining legislators seek only to maintain their current
probability of being reelected in the next election. Compared to vote maximizing
legislators, vote maintaining legislators are less eager to be responsive to new in-
formation concerning the salient interests of their constituents. With respect to the
behavior of vote maintaining legislators in response to collective action by constituents
of disparate resource capacity, I expect:
Vote Maintaining Strategy: Vote maintainers are at least marginally more
likely to vote with lower resource collective action participants than higher
resource participants.
Maintaining legislators place weights, Q and 1-Q, on voting for or against
a group so that the expected utility of their vote produces no expected change in
p, their perceived current probability of reelection. In practice, these weights mean
that legislators will at times pay less attention to constituency pressures and their
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reelection incentives in pursuit other goals. The maintainer’s strategy is therefore
E(∆p) = 0 = Q(x1 − z2)c1c2 +Qx1c1(1− c2) +Q(−z2)(1− c1)c2
+ (1−Q)(−z1 + x2)c1c2 + (1−Q)(−z1)c1(1− c2)
+ (1−Q)x2(1− c1)c2
= Qx1c1c2 −Qz2c1c2 +Qx1c1 −Qx1c1c2 −Qc2z2 +Qc1c2z2
− z1c1c2 +Qz1c1c2 + x2c1c2 −Qx2c1c2 − z1c1 + z1c1c2
+Qz1c1 −Qz1c1c2 + c2x2 − c1c2x2 −Qc2x2 +Qc1c2x2
= Qx1c1 −Qc2z2 +Qz1c1 −Qc2x2 − z1c1 + c2x2
= Q(x1c1 − c2z2 + z1c1 − c2x2)− z1c1 + c2x2
Q =
c1z1 − c2x2
c1z1 − c2x2 + c1x1 − c2z2
In order for the maintaining strategy to exist,
0 ≤ c1z1 − c2x2
c1(x1 + z1)− c2(x2 + z2) ≤ 1
This condition only holds if the ability of either group to reward the legisla-
tor’s behavior outweighs or even equals the ability of the opposing group to punish
the legislator (c1x1 ≥ c2z2 and c1z1 ≤ c2x2). Furthermore, it must be the case that
the ability of a group to punish a legislator’s voting behavior must equal or exceed the
ability of the opposing group to reward the legislator’s voting behavior (i.e., z2 ≥ x1
and z1 ≥ x2). The value of Q depends on the relationship between each group’s ability
to reward or punish the legislator relative to the other group. For every maintaining
legislator’s decision making strategy Q ≥ 1
2
.
First, consider the case where by assumption, S1 = S2 and z2 = x2 and if
z1 = x2 then Q =
1
2
as demonstrated below:
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Proof
Q =
c1z1 − c2x2
c1(x1 + z1)− c2(x2 + z2)
=
z1(c1 − c2)
c1(x1 + z1)− c2(x2 + z2)
=
z1(c1 − c2)
(x1 + z1)(c1 − c2)
=
z1
(z1 + z1)
=
1
2

Notice that Q, the weight that vote maintaining legislators apply to their
voting strategies in order to produce no expected change in the current perceived
probability of reelection, and the corresponding conditions are akin to those produced
in Chapter III of Fiorina (1974) for the case of Roll Call Decisions with a Conflictual
Constituency, where c1 > c2 and S1 > S2. Fiorina (1974) finds that a maintainer for
which c1x1 ≥ c2z2 will vote with the stronger group with a probability of at least .5
and that a maintainer for which c1z1 ≤ c2x2 will vote with the weaker group with a
probability of at least .5. I prove the lower bound for the maintaining strategy when
S1 = S2 suggesting that maintainers vote with the group who cares more at least half
of the time.
Figure 4.1 displays the variations in legislative responsiveness given the rela-
tive salience and abilities of groups to reward or punish the legislator in response to
her behavior. These figures represent the full range of maintaining strategies, which
are depicted on the x-axis. A maintaining strategy does not exist outside the bound-
aries of 0 and 1 such that 0.5 ≤ Q ≤ 1. This range is denoted by the vertical, dashed
lines. The y-axis denotes the relative salience that each group has for the issue. As the
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Figure 4.1: Roll-Call Voting Decisions Considering Salience of Issues and Con-
stituency Influence
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(A) Existence of Maintaining Strategies
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(B) Existence of Maitaining Strategies
Note: Simulations of maximizing and maintaining strategies comparing two groups of equal strength
(S1 = S2 or x1 + x2 = z1 + z2) but different salience levels (c1 > c2). The y-axis denotes how much
c1 > c2. While group strength remains constant, the ability of a group to punish or reward legislative
behavior changes. In Figures 1(A), z1 > z2 > x2 > x1. In Figures 1(B), z2 > z1 > x1 > x2. The
ratios above each subgraph indicate the ability of a group to punish over the ability of a group to
reward legislative behavior. The maintaining strategy exists within the two vertical, dashed lines.
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disparity in salience for the issue increases, the probability that a legislator supports
the more salient group approaches but continuously exceeds 1
2
. As group salience
nears parity, the existence of a maintaining strategy depends on the relative ability
of groups to reward or punish a legislator. Figure 4.1 (A) represents maintaining
strategies in response to groups of equal strength and differing salience levels, where
group 1 has greater salience for the issue than group 2 (c1 > c2), and the group who
cares more about the issue is able to punish the legislator more for her actions than
the group who cares less, but the group who cares more is also able to reward the
legislator less than the opposing group (z1 > z2 > x2 > x1). In Figure 4.1 (B), the
voting decision still relates to groups of equal strengths and differing salience for an
issue, but group 1 can now reward the legislator more than group 2 and group 2 can
punish more than group 1 (z2 > z1 > x1 > x2).
In these graphs, it is apparent that the lower limit for relative salience levels
increases in the difference in the ability of both groups to punish a legislator relative
to their ability to reward her behavior. Vote maintaining legislators choose to vote
with the group that cares more with a probability greater than or equal to .5. In
other words, they are less likely than vote maximizing legislators to demonstrate a
bias in their roll call voting behavior that favors black over white collective action
participants. This maintaining strategy is consistent across maintainer types.
As aforementioned, vote maintaining legislators face little electoral compe-
tition and tend to represent safe districts or those with homogeneous constituency
preferences. Decreased electoral competition and turnover has led to the concern that
legislators are less accountable to their constituents (Jones, 2013; Mayhew, 1974).
Still, even when reelection becomes sufficiently certain, legislators must be mindful
not to become too complacent such that they ignore the salient concerns of con-
stituents with the capacity to end their legislative careers (e.g. Ansolabehere, Brady
and Fiorina, 1992).
Republican legislators have greater levels of district preference homogeneity
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on policies benefitting racial and ethnic minorities than Democrats (Sniderman and
Carmines, 1997). Given the more conservative racial policy preferences among Re-
publicans, these legislators have little incentive support the more ideologically liberal
leaning preferences raised during collective action (see Figure 4.2) by participants of
any race. Constituents perceive greater levels of responsiveness when descriptively
represented by a legislator of their same race, regardless of whether that legislator
is also a co-partisan (Bowen and Clark, 2014; Tate, 2004). This means that black
constituents are more likely than whites to disapprove of Republican legislators who
are overwhelmingly white. Higher levels of disapproval among black compared to
white constituents suggests that when Republicans do decide to represent collective
action participants’ preferences, they may choose to represent black constituents who
may be more resolved to electorally punishing the legislator for ignoring their salient
preferences.
Figure 4.2: Ideology of Collective Action Participant Claims
(Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties)
8.81%
91.19%
Conservative
Liberal
Data Source: Dynamics of Collective Action, 1991-1995
While Republicans are generally less supportive of policies benefitting black
constituents, black, mostly Democratic, legislators are the most ardent supporters of
black interests (Minta, 2011; Hall, 1996). Consequently, when black constituents en-
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gage in collective action, it is likely that their black legislators are already supporting
claims made during collective action. However, there is some misalignment between
the personal goals of black legislators, black constituency preferences, and party pres-
sures. Among Democrats, black legislators vote more liberally than whites on roll
call votes in effort to advance black interests (Whitby, 1997). They sometimes even
vote more liberally than black constituency preferences (Tate, 2004). Accordingly,
black legislators appear more as vote maintainers than vote maximizers. Notwith-
standing, vote maintaining strategies only exist if the rewards lower resource groups
can contribute to reelection exceed the negative consequences of voting against higher
resource groups.1
If the Vote Maintaining and Vote Maximizing strategies are true, then the
refined Resource Constraint Hypothesis should also hold:
Refined Resource Constraint Hypothesis: Any legislator is more likely to sup-
port collective action by constituents with low resource capacity compared to
similar collective action by constituents with high resources.
When presented with the opportunity to vote on legislation relating to con-
cerns raised during collective action, legislators can vote to support or not support
their constituents’ concerns. The decision is complicated when considering the often
incompatible constituency preferences on many issues. Reelection-minded legislators
look to represent the salient concerns of their constituents to navigate this quandary.
As salience is not easily calculable, legislators can discern the intensity of constituency
preferences in the effort required to mobilize the collective action. Groups overcom-
ing greater barriers to participation are likely to have higher levels of salience for an
1I present the case of two collective action participant groups with conflicting preferences on an
issue. In the case that both low and high resource groups are on the same side of an issue, the
expectations still hold. A maximizer always votes with the lower resource constituency, and that the
maintainer votes with this constituency with a probability of at least .5 regardless of how much either
group cares about the issue. For maintainers, this is only true if neither group affects the legislator’s
reelection prospects or if both groups have equal amounts of concern for the issue (Fiorina, 1974,
ch. 3).
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issue. Meanwhile, the likelihood of salient concerns is less certain among groups for
which participation is less costly. The likelihood that a legislator will represent collec-
tive action participants also depends on how pertinent reelection concerns are to the
legislator. Reelection-minded legislators can reflect one of two behaviors: they can
act to maintain their current probability of reelection or they can act to maximize
that likelihood. Regardless of legislators’ strategies, legislators are generally more
likely to represent the interests of lower resource collective action participants than
their higher resource constituents. By implication of the vote maintaining and vote
maximizing strategies the following is also expected:
Electoral Context Hypothesis: The bias in favor of low resource relative to
high resource collective action participants is likely to be larger among vote
maximizing legislators than among vote maintaining legislators.
The vote maximizing strategy suggests that vote maximizing legislators should
be more supportive of the concerns of low resource constituents than high resource
constituents following their collective action, while the vote maintaining strategy
suggests that the voting behavior of vote maintaining legislators should be at least
marginally biased towards the interests of low resource collective action participants.
Therefore, vote maximizing legislators should demonstrate a bias in favor of lower
resource groups more often than vote maintaining legislators do. An empirical cor-
roboration of these theoretical implication should demonstrate that legislative bias at
least slightly favors black relative to white collective action participants, regardless
of the electoral context; and that vote maximizing legislators are more likely than
vote maintaining legislators to be biased in favor of black relative to white collective
action participants.
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Data and Measurement
To assess whether the refined Resource Constraint Hypothesis and the Elec-
toral Context Hypothesis are correct, I again employ the data on collective action from
the Dynamics of Collective Action (DCA) dataset from 1991 to 1995 (McAdam and
Su, 2002). This data includes any event reported in the New York Times involving
multiple persons publicly expressing a grievance. I locate the legislator representing
constituents engaging in collective action using GIS software and congressional dis-
trict boundaries from the US Census Bureau. The dependent variable, Support, is a
dichotomous measure of whether the legislator votes in support of an issue relating
to Civil Rights, Minority Issues, or Civil Liberties raised during collective action on
the first final passage roll call vote taking place after the collective action event but
before the next Congress convenes.
Each analysis includes an interaction between participant’s resource capacity
and the electoral context of the legislator, and the constituent terms of that inter-
action. I measure resources using Black Participants, which takes on a value of one
if collective action participants are black and zero if participants are white. Black
participants are the lower resource group. I characterize the legislator’s behavior as
vote maximizing or vote maintaining based on the legislator’s electoral context.
Vote Maximizers: I analyze two types of maximizers: (1) those uncertain
about who their loyal constituents are, and (2) those representing heterogeneous con-
stituencies. First, uncertain legislators are those without a good understanding of the
district they represent. These tend to be legislators in their first or second term (Fio-
rina, 1974). The variable, New Legislator, is coded as one if the legislator is in his or
her first or second term, and zero otherwise. Second, legislators representing districts
with conflicting opinions are likely to also represent marginal districts. This will be
a district in which a legislator wins by a Small Margin of Victory (less than 60%).
Legislators in this category might also be those representing mostly liberal Democrats
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since liberal Democrats conflict on their support for racial policies depending on their
levels of racial prejudice (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997). On issues concerning race,
Nonblack Democrats are likely to behave as vote maximizers because they represent
constituents with conflicting opinions on issues within the Civil Rights, Minority Is-
sues, and Civil Liberties Policy Agendas Project classification.
Vote Maintainers: Vote maintainers are largely from safe electoral districts.
Legislators with non-conflicting goals are likely to be ranking party members who
represent districts typical of their party. These legislators are also likely to be rep-
resenting safe electoral districts and are likely to have longer lengths of service in
Congress. Senior legislators are coded with a value of zero in the New Legislator vari-
able. Another indicator of safety is a large electoral margin of victory, or winning by
more than 65% (Fiorina, 1974). Legislators with large electoral margins of victory are
given a value of zero in the Small Margin of Victory variable. Safety is greater when
there is homogeneity of preferences in the district. Republican constituents typify
a consensual constituency on racial policies as they generally oppose them on polit-
ical grounds regardless of their level of racial prejudice (Sniderman and Carmines,
1997). As Republican legislators are most common to represent conservative, Re-
publican constituents, they are also likely to behave as vote maintainers on issues
of Civil Rights, Minorities Issues, and Civil Liberties. Black members of Congress
are also maintainers as they tend to represent districts with greater preference ho-
mogeneity (Lublin, 1997). Except for the analysis which compares Black Democrats
to Republicans the ensuing analyses compare vote maximizing legislators relative to
vote maintainers. The reference category for each of the models comparing nonblack
Democrats, black Democrats, and Republican legislators is denoted in the table.
To demonstrate that legislators are responsive to collective action partici-
pants in light of other legislative considerations, I include several variables that are
known to influence legislative behavior in the empirical models. Public Salience is
a measure of district level salience for civil rights, minority issues, and civil liberties
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created using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) (Warshaw and Rod-
den, 2012; Lax and Phillips, 2009), data from the 1992, 1994, and 1996 American
National Election Study Post-Election, and from the 1990 Decennial Summary File
3. From Lublin (1997)’s replication dataset, I include median levels of Education and
Income in the district; Percent Black and Percent Latino district level voting age
populations; Democratic Representative, which indicates whether the legislator is a
member of the Democratic or Republican Party; the legislator’s number of terms in
office, or Length of Service; whether the legislator is an Incumbent ; the legislator’s
Margin of Victory during the election; whether the legislator is a Black Representa-
tive, Latino Representative or Female Representative; and whether the district is in
a Southern State. The legislator’s Relative Voting Record on similar issues relative to
other legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives is developed using Poole and
Rosenthal NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
Electoral Context and Legislative Bias
Tables 4.3 through 4.5 display the results of maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) models of logistic regressions with congressional district fixed effects.2 Each
model includes a binary variable for Black Participants, a binary variable compar-
ing vote maximizing and vote maintaining variables, and an interaction of the two
terms. This model specification allows for the effect of collective action participants
on legislators’ voting behavior to depend on the electoral context and for the effect
of electoral context on legislators’ voting to depend on the race of collective action
participants (Stock and Watson, 2007).
Table 4.3 examines the legislative support for black and white collective ac-
tion participants’ interests by new and senior members of Congress. The first three
terms in this model provide some support for both the refined Resource Constraint
2I use the logit command in STATA for the fixed effects models.
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Hypothesis and the Electoral Context Hypothesis. As both Black Participants and
New Legislators are binary variables and the interaction of the two variables is also
included in the model specification, the coefficient on the first term shows the dif-
ference in the effect of black participants relative to white participants on legislative
support for constituents’ interests when the value of the second term is zero (ie, when
the legislator has more than two terms of service in Congress) and other variables are
held constant(Stock and Watson, 2007). The positive and statistically significant co-
efficient on the first term in the model, Black Participants, supports the expectation
that Senior legislators are more likely to support black collective action participants
than they are to support white participants’ concerns following collective action. This
suggests that vote maintaining, senior legislators, who have less incentive than new
legislators to be responsive to constituency concerns are still more likely to represent
the salient interests of lower resource participants than they are to represent higher
resource participants. The positive coefficient on New legislator indicates that legisla-
tors in their first or second term in Congress are more likely than senior legislators to
support white collective action participants. This log odds coefficient does not meet
conventional levels of statistical significance.
The coefficient on the interaction term is the difference in the effect of collec-
tive action participants’ race on legislative behavior for new legislators versus senior
legislators (Stock and Watson, 2007). It shows the likelihood of legislative support of
new legislators responding to black participants’ concerns relative to senior legisla-
tors responding to white participants’ concerns. Any difference in legislative support
could be attributable to the race of the participants, the seniority of the legislator, or
both. The standard errors suggest that there is not statistically significant difference
between the voting behavior of new legislators in response to black collective action
and the voting behavior of senior legislators in response to white collective action.
Notwithstanding, the interaction term does not directly address the refined Resource
Constraint Hypothesis or the Electoral Context Hypothesis. The inclusion of the in-
65
Table 4.3: Legislative Support of Freshmen and Sophomore vs Senior Members of
Congress
Black Participants 0.614∗∗∗
(0.161)
New Legislator 0.146
(0.197)
Black Participants X New Legislator 0.075
(0.266)
Public Salience −2.687∗∗∗
(0.603)
Education −0.0937
(0.686)
Income 1.335∗∗
(0.576)
Percent Black −2.209
(1.563)
Percent Latino −0.600
(1.945)
Democratic Representative 1.197∗∗∗
(0.408)
Relative Voting Record −1.082
(0.805)
Length of Service 0.973
(0.829)
Incumbent −0.702∗∗∗
(0.200)
Margin of Victory 0.917
(0.629)
Black Representative 0.016
(0.651)
Latino Representative 0.198
(0.686)
Female Representative 0.207
(0.329)
Southern State −4.353∗∗
(1.768)
Constant −0.493
(1.574)
Congressional District Dummies Y es
Observations 4441
Log likelihood −2392.2
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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teraction term in the model does allow for calculations of predicted probabilities for
relationships that do address the hypotheses.
Figure 4.3 shows the likelihood of legislative support for black relative to
white collective action participants for each type of legislative behavior – vote main-
taining (senior) legislators and vote maximizing (new) legislators. Each bar repre-
sents the difference in predicted probabilities when all other covariates are held at
their mean values. Vote maintaining, senior legislators are 15% more likely to support
black collective action participants than they are to support white collective action
participants. Vote maximizing legislators are also more likely to support black than
white collective action participants with a predicted probability of 0.17. The 95%
confidence intervals on each of the differences in predicted probabilities demonstrates
that the effects of resource capacity on legislative support is statistically significant.
While Figure 4.3 provides support for the refined Resource Constraint Hypothesis it
provides limited support for the Electoral Context Hypothesis – the legislative bias
in favor of black collective action participants appears to be larger for new legisla-
tors than for senior legislators. Figure 4.6 provides a clearer representation of the
differences in vote maximizing and vote maintaining legislators’ behavior.
As the coefficients on New Legislator and the interaction term in Table 4.3
show, vote maximizing legislators appear to more likely than vote maintaining leg-
islators to support the interests of collective action participants. However, these
differences fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Figure 4.4 con-
firms this relationship. There is no statistically significant difference in the legislative
behavior of vote maximizing (new) legislators and vote maximizing (senior) legislators
in response to collective action participants.
Table 4.4 addresses whether legislators representing heterogeneous districts
are more likely than legislators representing homogenous districts to support black
relative to white collective action participants. The degree of district heterogeneity
is measured by whether a legislator has a small (winning by less than 60%) or large
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Figure 4.3: Resources and Legislative Support by Length of Service
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Note: Difference in the predicted probability of legislative support of low resource group relative to
high resource group based on the model in Table 4.3. All covariates are held at their means.
Figure 4.4: Resources and Legislative Support by Length of Service (Length of
Service)
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Note: Difference in the predicted probability of legislative support of vote maximizing (freshman
and sophomore) legislators relative to vote maintaining (senior) legislators based on the model in
Table 4.3. All covariates are held at their means.
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(winning by more than 65%) margin of victory in his or her reelection.3 The posi-
tive and statistically significant logistic coefficient on Black Participants reveals that
legislators with large margins of victory are more likely to support black collective
action participants than white participants. Additionally, the positive logistic coeffi-
cient on Small Margin of Victory suggests that less electorally secure legislators are
more likely than more electoral security to respond to the interests of white collective
action participants. However, this relationship fails to reach statistical significance
at the 95% confidence level (p=.077). The interaction term is also positive and sta-
tistically insignificant. This term compares the influence of participants resources
on the legislative behavior of legislators with small versus large margins of victory.
Alone, the coefficient does not reveal whether differences in legislative behavior are
due to the race of the participants or the electoral security of the legislator. Once
again, calculating the predicted probabilities provides further interpretation of the
empirical findings as they relate to the theoretical expectations.
Figure 4.5 displays the difference in predicted probabilities of legislative sup-
port following collective action by constituents of disparate resource capacities for
legislators with large and small margins of victory, respectively. Both vote main-
taining and vote maximizing legislators are more likely to support black collective
action participants’ interests than they are to support white collective action partic-
ipants’ interests. Vote maintaining legislators with large margins of victory are 8%
more likely to support black collective action participants than they are to support
white collective action participants. Vote maximizing legislators represented by small
margins of victory are 13% more likely to support black collective action partici-
pants relative to white collective action participants. Both of these differences are
statistically significant.
3This variable excludes legislators that win by more than 60% but less than 65% to provide clearer
cutpoints for the comparison of vote maximizing and vote maintaining legislators. The Appendix
displays the tables for models where Margin of Victory is coded with a cutpoint at 60% and another
with a cutpoint at 65% (see Tables C.6 and C.7). The results are generally robust to the coding of
the margin of victory variable.
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Table 4.4: Legislative Support and Electoral Margin of Victory
Black Participants 0.326∗∗
(0.166)
Small Margin of Victory 0.693∗
(0.392)
Black Participants X Small Margin of Victory 0.302
(0.318)
Public Salience −2.338∗∗∗
(0.796)
Education −0.0713
(0.930)
Income 0.280
(0.776)
Percent Black −0.172
(1.913)
Percent Latino 0.0608
(2.743)
Democratic Representative 1.758∗∗∗
(0.489)
Relative Voting Record −1.132
(1.002)
Length of Service 0.313
(0.767)
Incumbent −0.752∗∗∗
(0.258)
Margin of Victory 1.550
(1.142)
Black Representative −0.656
(0.802)
Latino Representative −0.196
(0.870)
Female Representative 0.780∗
(0.405)
Southern State −5.178∗∗∗
(1.789)
Constant −0.459
(1.813)
Congressional District Dummies Y es
Observations 3703
Log likelihood −2079.8
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4.5: Resources and Legislative Support by Margin of Victory
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Note: Difference in the predicted probability of legislative support of low resource group relative to
high resource group based on the model in Table 4.4. All covariates are held at their means.
Vote maximizing (small margin of victory) legislators are also more respon-
sive to collective action participants than vote maintaining (large margin of victory)
legislators with one exception. In Table 4.4, the log odds coefficient on Small Margin
of Victory reveals a positive but statistical insignificant difference in the legislative
styles of legislators in responding to white collective action participants. The pre-
dicted probabilities in Figure 4.6 reveals a similar relationship. The probability of
legislative support in response to white collective action participants among vote max-
imizing legislators with small margins of victory is 17% higher than the probability
of legislative support among vote maintaining legislators with large margins of vic-
tory. This difference fails to reach the 95% confidence level for statistical significance
(p-value = 0.06) when all covariates are held at their means. In response to black par-
ticipants, the likelihood of legislative support among legislators with small margins of
victory is 22% higher than that of vote maintaining legislators with large margins of
victory. That difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. These
results with respect to the legislator’s margin of victory provide some support for both
the refined Resource Constraint Hypothesis and the Electoral Context Hypothesis.
71
Figure 4.6: Differences in Maximizing and Maintaining Behaviors (Margin of Victory)
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Note: Differences in the predicted probability of legislative support of vote maximizing relative to
vote maintaining Democrats by resource levels of collective action participants based on the model
in Table 4.3. All covariates are held at their means.
Table 4.5 displays the results of the empirical model assessing the legislative
support of black and white collective action participants’ interests by legislator’s party
and race.4 This table speaks to a cleavage in extant literature that evaluates legislative
responsiveness and representation of black constituents. While some work suggests
that black legislators are more likely to represent the interests of black constituents
(Tate, 2004; Whitby, 1997), others suggest that black legislators are less responsive to
black constituents than their legislative counterparts (Bowen and Clark, 2014; Swain,
1993). The theory of legislative bias posits that legislative support in response to
collective action participants is moderated by whether legislators believe that con-
stituents have salient concerns for an issue and whether the legislator is electorally
insecure enough to warrant capitulating to those interests (i.e., whether legislators
behave as vote maximizers of vote maintainers).
Nonblack legislators represent more heterogeneous congressional districts than
the districts represented by black Democrats, so they have more incentive to support
4Due to multicollinearity, I do not include controls for Democratic Representative or Black Rep-
resentative in the models assessing the race and party of the legislator.
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sub-constituency preferences that diverge from their own preferences. This theory
would therefore lead to the expectations that nonblack Democrats who are most
susceptible to constituency pressures would demonstrate a greater bias in legislative
support favoring black participants than other legislators. At the same time, black
legislators have personal preferences that align with black constituency preferences
even in the absence of strong constituency pressures. So, black legislators are likely
to already be supporting to the intense preferences raised by black collective ac-
tion participants. Moreover, Republicans, who represent districts with homogenous
constituency preferences in opposition to the salient concerns of collective action par-
ticipants and who do not rely on the votes of liberal constituents for reelection, are
less likely than all other legislators to favor black constituents. The empirical results
confirm these expectations.
The log odds coefficients on Black Participants Table 4.5 demonstrates that
there is no statistically significant difference in Black or Republican legislators’ sup-
port of black collective action participants relative to white participants. The only
statistically significant relationships are on the Nonblack Democrat (Maximizing) vari-
able and the interaction term in Model II. However, these relationships are not sta-
tistically significant at the 95% confidence level (p-value=0.79 and p=0.093, respec-
tively). The predicted probabilities in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 provide more information
with respect to the theoretical expectations.
The second graph in Figure 4.7 displays the estimated differences in pre-
dicted probabilities from Model II while holding all other covariates at their means.
Nonblack Democrats are less likely than black Democrats to support collective action
participants, but these estimates fail to reach the 95% confidence level of statisti-
cal significance (p-value = .064 for white participants and p-value = 0.284 for black
participants). Calculating the predicted probabilities from the other models in Table
4.5 reveals that there is no statistically significant difference in the vote maximizing
and vote maintaining behavior of legislators when considering their race and party as
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Table 4.5: Legislative Support by Race and Party
Relative to (Vote Maintaining):
Republican Black Democrat Republican
Model I Model II Model III
Black Participants 0.250 0.339 0.201
(0.314) (0.255) (0.331)
Nonblack Democrat (Maximizing) 0.271 −1.341∗
(0.645) (0.762)
Black Democrat (Maintaining) −0.0935
(2.268)
Black Participants X Nonblack Democrat 0.559 0.518∗
(0.357) (0.308)
Black Participants X Black Democrat 0.199
(0.421)
Public Salience −2.512∗∗∗ −4.024∗∗∗ −2.921∗∗∗
(0.825) (0.910) (1.060)
Education 0.199 −1.028 6.137∗
(0.934) (0.948) (3.701)
Income 1.089 2.266∗∗∗ −3.461
(0.695) (0.778) (2.390)
Percent Black 1.132 −4.389∗∗ 0.880
(3.259) (1.867) (4.946)
Percent Latino −3.309 −3.162 4.153
(2.982) (2.293) (6.745)
Relative Voting Record 0.631 −1.428 −3.113∗∗
(1.040) (1.241) (1.474)
Length of Service 0.480 1.191 4.989∗
(0.836) (0.809) (2.967)
Incumbent −0.355 −0.993∗∗∗ −2.020∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.222) (0.672)
Margin of Victory −0.370 1.193 5.696∗∗
(0.852) (0.792) (2.537)
Latino Representative −0.906 1.521∗ −3.211
(0.941) (0.777) (3.520)
Female Representative −0.978∗ 0.725∗ 6.420∗∗∗
(0.515) (0.393) (2.442)
Southern State −4.634∗∗∗ −1.169 −2.503
(1.786) (1.857) (2.072)
Constant −0.0929 3.591∗∗ −4.968∗
(1.603) (1.644) (3.006)
Congressional District Dummies Y es Y es Y es
Observations 2366 3575 2366
Log likelihood −1206.9 −2021.4 −1206.9
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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the differences in predicted probabilities fail to reach conventional levels of statistical
significance and are either positive or essentially zero.
Figure 4.7: Differences in Maximizing and Maintaining Behaviors (Party and Race)
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Note: Difference in the predicted probability of legislative support of vote maximizing relative to
vote maintaining Democrats by resource levels of collective action participants based on the model
in Table 4.5. All covariates are held at their means.
Stronger support for the theoretical expectations is found in Figure 4.8, which
illustrates the difference in legislative support for black relative to white collective
action participants given the race and party of the legislator. As expected, the bias in
favor of black collective action participants is largest and only statistically significant
at the 95% confidence level for vote maximizing, nonblack Democrats. The bias
in favor of black collective action participants fails to reach conventional levels of
statistical significance for any of vote maintaining legislators giving credence to the
expected strategy of vote maintainers to only be marginally more likely to support
black over white collective action participants (i.e., the probability of support for
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black relative to white collective action participants is greater than or equal to 0.5).
Figure 4.8: Resources and Legislative Support by Race and Party of Legislator
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Note: Differences in the predicted probability of legislative support of low resource group relative
to high resource group based on the models in Table 4.5. All covariates are held at their means.
Each of the analyses in Tables 4.3 through 4.5 and their subsequent figures
are conducted in consideration of measures identified in extant literature to have an
influence on legislative decision-making. For example, in each model, I include district
level public salience for civil rights, minority issues, and civil liberties. Public salience
is not a measure of district preference but rather the percentage of people in a district
with a high level of salience for an issue. The purpose of this measure is to control
for shifts in legislative behavior that are in response to shifts in district level salience
instead of collective action. In all models, legislators are less supportive of collective
action participants’ issue preferences as public salience increases and this relationship
is statistically significant. Perhaps this is because the public’s preferences diverge from
collective action participants and legislators are less willing to support the preferences
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of a smaller constituency when a larger group is more attune to legislative action.
As expected, in all models, incumbent legislators are less likely than new
legislators to support collective action participants’ interests. This is because incum-
bents have a greater knowledge of their district than new legislators do. They are,
therefore, less susceptible than legislators in their first term to constituency pressures.
Legislators representing congressional districts in southern states are less likely than
other legislators to support the mostly liberal preferences of black and white collec-
tive action participants. Additionally, democrats are more likely than Republicans
to support the preferences of collective action participants. Both of these relation-
ships comport with expectation considering that southern legislators tend to vote
more conservatively than nonsouthern legislators, and Democrats tend to vote more
liberally than Republican legislators.
A legislator’s voting record on Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liber-
ties relative to other legislators in each Congress, fails to reach statistical significance
in most models, suggesting that legislative behavior on roll call votes containing
issues raised during collective action may not be much different than legislative be-
havior more generally. An exception occurs when considering vote maintaining, black
Democrats relative to Republicans. The more liberal a legislator is, the less likely he
or she is to support collective action participants’ preferences. These results, together
with the relationship between legislative behavior and other measures of constituency
influence imply that legislative behavior in response to collective action participants
depends largely on the electoral context.
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On Legislative Responsiveness to Black Collective
Action Participants
Scholars continuously investigate whether and the extent to which legislators
reflect the preferences of their constituents in their roll call voting behavior (see, for
instance, Achen, 1978; Fiorina, 1977; Miller and Stokes, 1963). In this work, I extend
the theory of legislative bias in relation to collective action participants in different
electoral contexts. I demonstrate that while legislators are responsive to constituents
with greater levels of issue salience, as revealed through the resource levels of collective
action participants, the extent of legislative bias depends on the electoral context. In
no case does legislative bias favor white, higher resource collective action participants
- a well-established bias in scholarship on legislative bias. Legislators are at least
as likely to support black participants relative to white participants, regardless of
the electoral context. This bias is largest for legislators behaving to maximize their
probability of reelection. Notwithstanding, the amount of legislative bias in favor
of black constituents is likely to be even be stronger than what is revealed in these
analyses. To be sure, the effect of constituency influence is masked by the influence of
party pressures or legislative voting behavior (e.g. Crespin, 2010; Gerber and Lewis,
2004; Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Fiorina, 1974).
This research has important implications for scholarship on the representation
of black constituency interests. Competing conclusions concerning whether legislators
are responsive to black constituents likely stem from the electoral contexts in which
the interaction between representation and constituency influence occurs. Nonblack
Democrats may be generally less responsive to black constituents, but they are more
likely to submit to the salient interests of collective action participants. As black col-
lective action participants must overcome greater barriers to engage in participation
equal to that of their white counterparts, their participation suggests to legislators
that they have greater care or salience for the issue than their higher resource counter-
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parts. Greater levels of salience suggests to legislators that high salience participants
are more willing than lower salience participants to reward or punish their legislator
for her voting behavior. Consequently, electorally insecure, nonblack Democrats have
greater levels of responsiveness to black collective action participants.
Legislative responsiveness to collective action participants is less evident
among Republicans and black Democrats. Republicans do not have to respond to
black collective action participants because they do not need their votes to attain
reelection. Black Democrats are not as responsive to black collective action partici-
pants relative to their nonblack counterparts in the Democratic Party, but this does
not mean that they do not represent black constituent interests. In general, black
Democrats have a sense of linked fate that leads them to pursue policies they believe
will benefit the black community (Minta, 2011). Their electoral security permits black
Democrats to pursue what they believe to be good public policy even if that means
sometimes voting against the preferences of black collective action participants. Nev-
ertheless, the results here demonstrate that all legislators are at least as likely to
support black collective action participants as they are to represent white collective
action participants.
In general, I demonstrate in this work that legislative behavior is most likely
to favor black constituents engaging in collective action when those legislators behave
to maximize votes in hopes of attaining reelection. I reach conclusions about the
legislative behavior of representatives by exploring three types of vote maximizers
and four types of vote maintainers. In no case are legislators more likely to represent
the more advantaged, white collective action participants over white collective action
participants.
To this point, I argue that legislators are most responsive to collective action
when the participants are disadvantaged. This argument is thus far based on a
dichotomous analysis of resource capacities. However, there is variation in resource
capacities within high and low resource groups. In the next chapter, I continue to
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empirically evaluate the theory of legislative bias with an analysis of organizational
resource capacities. I assess how organizing and mobilizing capacities influence a
legislator’s proclivity to support preferences expressed during collective action. I
find that legislators are generally more likely to support low resource groups than
high resource groups, except when groups are able to mount both organizing and
mobilizing resource capacities.
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CHAPTER V
Why David Usually? Wins:
Organizational Resources and Legislative
Bias to Collective Action
“When Cesar Chavez used to say ‘power makes you stupid,’
this is what he meant: you come to rely on an overwhelming
resource advantage, which is exactly what creates
opportunities for the Davids of the world.”
-Marshall Ganz 2009, p. 253
In the 1960s and 1970s, the National Farm Worker’s Association (NFWA)
attained collective bargaining agreements and legislation benefitting California farm
workers when no other organization in all of the twentieth century had been able to do
so. They outperformed the more powerful AFL-CIO and Teamsters unions, which had
greater financial resources, more staff experienced in unionizing, and superior political
connections. Recognizing their disadvantages, the Cesar Chavez-led NFWA leveraged
its organization’s greater motivation, personal experience, and salient knowledge of
the plight and circumstances of farm workers to organize thousands of politically
marginalized Californians to engage in collective action for the ability to unionize
(Ganz, 2009). Ganz (2009) demonstrates how one organization made up primarily
of ethnic minorities surpassed the labors of its more resourced counterparts when
the odds were not in their favor. That work speaks of the win by the NFWA as
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an insurmountable, exceptional feat that is attainable when an organization is able
to effectively leverage its relative resource disadvantage. I argue that the ability of
lower resource groups to be more successful in their collective action efforts than their
higher resource counterparts is something that should be expected more generally.
The Resource Constraint Hypothesis posits that when legislators view col-
lective action by their constituents, they consider the resource capacity of the par-
ticipants to infer how salient the issues raised during the collective action are to
the participations. Legislators are more likely to reward collective action by lower
resource groups who must overcome greater barriers to participation because they
believe that groups engaging in costlier participation are more likely to reward (or
punish) the legislator for supporting (or opposing) the group’s salient interests. Sup-
port for this hypothesis is demonstrated in Chapter III, and represented in Figure
5.1. Legislators are 18 percent more likely to legislatively support the interests of
collective action participants when there is no formal interest group present than
they are to support the interests of collective action featuring a formal interest group.
Notwithstanding, there is a great deal of variation among interest groups that engage
in collective action.
Figure 5.1: Formal Interest Groups and Legislative Support
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Note: This is a representation of the difference in predicted probability of legislative support of the
lack (vs presence) of an organized interest group in Figure 3.1 based on Model III in Table 3.1.
All other variables are held at their means.
Some interest groups are like the NFWA. They have passionate leaders, active
82
members, and few financial resources. Other interest groups are like the American
Academy of Pediatricians. They are led by professional staffers who advocate with
substantial budgets on behalf of their members. Then, there are those interest groups
that employ a mix of low and high organizational resource capacities. When consid-
ering the variation in organizational resource capacities, it becomes apparent that
a simple comparison of collective action without a formal organization to collective
action with a formal organization only begins to address the extent of the influence
of organizational resources on the responsiveness of legislators to collective action in
their districts.
In this chapter, I further assess the influence of organizational resource ca-
pacity on legislative behavior by evaluating the legislative response to the collective
action of four categories of groups: those not featuring a formal interest group(i.e.,
grassroots collective action), organizing interest groups, mobilizing interest groups,
and interest groups with both organizing and mobilizing capacities. I begin this en-
deavor by describing the proclivity for collective action by different organizational
types. I then extend the Resource Constraint Hypothesis by comparing each of the
organizational resource capacity types to each other. I follow that discussion with
an explanation of the methods for evaluating the expectations. I conclude with a
discussion of the results and address any deviations. The findings suggest that leg-
islators are more responsive to interest groups with organizing capacity than they
are to grassroots collective action. Legislators are least responsive to high resource
groups represented by mobilizing only interest groups.
The Indirect Role of Organizations
The costliness of participation manifests in many ways. Knowing where to
protest, whom to vote for, or what issues are important are daunting and time con-
suming tasks even for the most educated constituents. Determining the best time
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and place for an activity is difficult for individuals without planning or mobilizing
experience. Having the time to participate in an already planned event is uncommon
for residents working multiple jobs or caring for family members. Even when time is
adequate, securing transportation or being in the right networks to know when and
where an event is happening can be problematic for many low resource groups.
Indirectly, civic organizations and unions play a major role in facilitating
participation by building the capacity of their members to engage in collective ac-
tion. They develop members’ problem-solving skills, enhance leadership capacities,
broaden social networks, and increase the efficacy of their members. In promoting
civic skills (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) and supporting political mobiliza-
tion (McKenzie, 2004) civic organizations provide social capital that translates into
civic engagement and then into political participation (Putnam, 1995). Similarly,
participation in union activities leads to workers who engage in politics and social
movement organizations (Kerrissey and Schofer, 2013; Nissen, 2010), particularly as
unions evolve to focus more on developing their memberships’ skills. For example,
instead of sending union representatives to resolve disputes, unions are training their
members to resolve their own problems, which leads to a membership with a greater
capacity for collective action (Voss and Sherman, 2000). So while the organizations
that develop these capacities may not directly engage in specific collective action
events, they facilitate collective action by developing constituents capable of mobiliz-
ing without the presence of formal organizations.
Nevertheless, declines in the number of civic organizations (Skocpol, 2007;
Putnam, 1995) and private sector unions (Freeman, 1998; Farber and Western, 2001)
creates uncertainty in the ability of lower resource groups to engage in collective ac-
tion without the energy of a formal organization. During the height of unionization,
the majority of unions were in the private sector representing lower income, blue col-
lar workers. Today, however, a negligible percentage of the US population is covered
by a collective bargaining agreement and employees who are represented by unions
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are mostly in the public sector. The decline in the number of private sector unions
coincides with an increase in public sector unions (Freeman and Han, 2012) repre-
senting professionals workers, like teachers and nurses, with higher levels of education
(Kerrissey and Schofer, 2013). These individuals are already likely to participate and
to be asked to participate (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). As such, unions and civic
organizations reach and affect fewer inactive participants.
The absence of indirect mobilizers has left a void that may be filled by the
internet and online social networks. It appears that in the place of formal, capacity
building organizations, like churches, universities, and unions, more recent collec-
tive action is being brokered online. Change.org has made the mobilization of online
petitioning effortless. Offline events, like die-ins, vigils, and boycotts are being coordi-
nated using online social networking services, including Twitter and Facebook. These
networks may be creating opportunities for mobilization without organizations but
they do not preclude the presence of organizations as mobilizing forces. Organizations
still play a more direct role in fostering collective action.
Collective Action Among Interest Groups
Interest groups engaging in collective action come in all shapes and sizes.
Some interest groups, like advocacy groups, trade associations, and labor unions have
broad, active membership bases and fewer financial resources relative to other organi-
zations (c.f. Gerber, 1999; Dahl, 1961), which makes them less likely than businesses to
lobby legislators (Boehmke and Patty, 2013; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Golden, 1998;
Furlong and Kerwin, 2005). Instead, these organizations leverage their large mem-
bership bases during collective action to influence policy (c.f. Kerrissey and Schofer,
2013). Other, well-financed organizations, like businesses, have few active members
but are able to hire lobbyists with issue-specific expertise and greater networks to
pursue their interests. These organizations rarely engage in collective action relying
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instead on inside lobbying activities to pursue their goals (Kollman, 1998). Notwith-
standing, collective action is not beyond the scope of business organizations. Recog-
nizing the strength of collective action by the politically marginalized, well-financed
organizations subsidize participation to give the appearance of a grassroots effort in
pursuit of their goals (Walker, 2009).
Not only have the number of unions and civic organizations declined, but the
character of membership organizations has changed. Advocacy groups have evolved
from organizations with members actively engaged in volunteering into organizations
with a primarily dues paying membership (Skocpol, 2007). These more profession-
alized organizations are now more likely to call on their members to donate to a
lobbying campaign employing policy experts than to ask their members to partici-
pate in a demonstration to further one of the organization’s causes. Interest groups
today, even those with a history of mobilizing their members for collective action,
are more likely to employ a more professional staff with law degrees or congressional
experience and fewer connections to grassroots efforts. Indeed, the reason many lower
resourced groups have been able to attain modest levels of success is due to their lead-
erships’ greater levels of motivation for the cause and salient knowledge concerning
their membership, which is less common among the leadership of highly resourced or-
ganizations (Ganz, 2009). When comparing organizations and their collective action
engagement, not only is the propensity of the organization to induce collective action
important but so too is the nature of the instigation.
A Legislator’s View of Groups and Collective Ac-
tion
Legislators’ desire to support collective action participants stems from the
constraint of reelection. Regardless of a legislator’s motive for being an elected of-
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ficial, they must be in office for that motivation to become realized. With this in
mind, legislators desire to represent the salient interests of their constituents as it
is on those salient issues that constituents will base their voting decisions. The Re-
source Constraint Hypothesis states that in response to collective action by their
constituents, legislators are more likely to support the interests of lower resource con-
stituents because their costlier participation is more likely to be induced by a salient
interest and because lower resource groups are less likely than their counterparts to
be actively communicating their interests to legislators through other forms of par-
ticipation. Thus, collective action by lower resource groups possibly represents the
first communication legislators receive about an interest with electoral repercussions.
The resources that an interest group brings to a collective action event are ex-
tensive. Practiced mobilizers can initiate a collective action event with a large number
of participants and a clear message, and because of their experience, they can initiate
the event without the participants having salient interest in the issue. The mobilizers
could motivate participation by making it a social event or they could incentivize par-
ticipation with money or other perks. Wary of the practiced strategizing of interest
groups, legislators are more willing to believe the communication signaled through
collective action following minimal mobilizing efforts since these grassroots efforts are
more likely – relative to collective action induced by formal interest groups – to reflect
true issue salience (Kollman, 1998). Restating the Resource Constraint Hypothesis as
it applies to organizational resource capacities leads to the first expectation for this
analysis:
No Interest Group vs Interest Group: Collective action not featuring a formal
interest group is more likely than that featuring any interest group to receive
legislative support.
Nevertheless, organizations differ in the ways in which they engage their
membership. Some interest groups mobilize their membership while others organize
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members for collective action. Mobilizing “is more sporadic involving large numbers
of people for relatively short periods of time and probably for relatively dramatic
activities” (Payne, 1989). Mobilizing organizations do the work of coordinating an
event and they implore likely participants to take part in the event. Building mem-
bers’ capacity might happen, but it is not mobilizing interest groups’ top priority.
Their goal is to get as many people to participate in an event without building par-
ticipants’ capacity for civic engagement (Han, 2014). Organizing involves building
the capacity of individuals to be active participants in the organization. Interest
groups that organize call upon their members to assist in coordinating events and to
become influential in the organization’s direction (Ganz, 2009; Payne, 1989). Success
for organizing groups is measured by the development of leaders who also participate.
Legislators are most fearful that a previous vote on an issue could become
politicized during a campaign and could negatively effect their reelection prospects
(Arnold, 1990). Collective action by organizing interest groups represents a credible
threat these organizations can legitimately re-mobilize constituents during an elec-
tion. This is most plausible when an organization has sustained interactions with
constituents in a legislator’s district. Organizations with local or regional chapters
fit this criteria because they have a physical presence in the communities they claim
to represent, which facilitates active membership (Skocpol, 2007). Strong ties within
a community also assists the organization’s leadership in knowing which issues are
truly salient for constituents (Ganz, 2009). There is nothing worse than a legislator
supporting an interest an organization claims is important for constituents and then
discovering that members were not actually concerned about the issue. Such was the
case with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (Kollman, 1998). The
AARP convinced legislators that the bill was what their constituents wanted; but
when the bill passed, senior citizens were so vocal in their outrage that Congress
repealed the Act in 1989.
Mobilizing organizations are less connected to their membership. They tend
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to have a dues paying membership, large budgets, a large staff, and research and lob-
bying activities. These are all characteristics of professionally managed organizations
populated by higher resourced members (Skocpol, 2007, p. 39), whom I argue are less
likely to receive legislative support than lower resourced constituents. Organizations
relying primarily on members to pay dues are less likely to mobilize constituents for
collective action (Skocpol, 2007). In addition to the fact that organizations with dues
paying members are less likely to have personal connections with their members than
organizations with active members, collective action from these groups may not be as
informative to legislators. Dues paying members are more likely to be professionals
who relay their salience for issues through lobbying efforts, campaign contributions,
and other traditional methods of political participation. Collective action is then
another of many methods legislators learn about the salient concerns of their con-
stituents. Therefore, the salience signal from collective action is less influential for
these groups for legislative behavior than for lower resource groups. Consequently,
Organizing vs Mobilizing Organizations: Collective action featuring organiz-
ing organizations is more likely than that featuring mobilizing organizations
to receive legislative support.
Other characteristics of mobilizing organizations relate to financial incentives.
Organizations with large budgets or budgets funded by external sources are less ac-
countable to their members and more accountable to their external funding grantors
(Ganz, 2009). When organizations are not held accountable by their members, their
ability to possess salient knowledge about the members’ concerns and needs decreases.
The size of a professional staff also influences the legitimacy of organizations’ collec-
tive action. A large, employed staff signifies a leadership with less of an interest in
seeing the organization’s goals realized (Ganz, 2009). They are motivated by financial
incentives and less so by personal concerns. Small staff, on the other hand, reflect the
need for a more active membership. The staff itself can not feasibly pursue all of the
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organization’s efforts. The organization must rely on active members for collective
action or shift their efforts towards lobbying or research tactics that require fewer
participants (Han, 2014). Research and lobbying activities could involve the partici-
pation of members, but organizations that rely mostly on these tactics are less likely
to be effective compared to tactics that engage members in novel collective actions.
Certainly, tactics are most effective when they are creative, diverse, and catch their
targets off guard (Ganz, 2009; Kollman, 1998).
Organizations are not forced into choosing to pursue either organizing or mo-
bilizing strategies; they can do both. Organizations, like the NAACP, have a large,
professional staff with dues paying members. Their national offices lobby and dissem-
inate research, while their local and regional chapters engage members to volunteer
in activities like voter registration drives. Organizing and mobilizing interest groups
have greater financial resources than purely organizing groups while also possessing
the active membership base necessary for collective action that is not characteris-
tic of mobilizing interest groups. Because of their higher financial and membership
resources, compared to organizing only interest groups, collective action by interest
groups characterized by both is easier to instigate. Therefore, I expect the following:
Organizing and Mobilizing vs Organizing Only Interest Group: Collective ac-
tion featuring an organizing and mobilizing interest group is less likely than
that featuring an organizing only interest group to receive legislative support.
While organizing and mobilizing interest groups benefit from the active par-
ticipation of their membership and the financial resources of external sponsors, the
staff and membership is likely to differ from that of mobilizing only interest groups.
The diverse expertise of professional and rank-and-file leadership means that interest
groups characterized by organizing and mobilizing have a better awareness of the
salient interests of their active membership. The professional staff of mobilizing only
interest groups uses its knowledge of pursuing more institutional tactics – including
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letter-writing campaigns, petitions, and lobbying – to pursue their interests. The dif-
ferences in the collective action tactics is displayed in Table 5.1. As the table reveals,
mobilizing only organizations are more likely than mobilizing and organizing interest
groups to use institutional tactics requiring skills acquired with higher levels of edu-
cation than extra-institutional tactics. However, it is not just differences in staff that
differentiates mobilizing only interest groups from mobilizing and organizing interest
groups.
Table 5.1: Organizational Capacity and Collective Action Tactics
Organizing Only Organizing and Mobilizing Mobilizing Only
Institutional Tactics 17 325 437
Extra-Institutional Tactics 1,231 1,814 1,023
Total 1,248 2,139 1,460
Note: Data on tactics is acquired from the Dynamics of Collective Action Dataset. Organizational
resource capacity classifications are made based on a novel dataset of information obtained from the
Internet.
Mobilizing only interest groups tend to be professional organizations, busi-
nesses and other types of financially secure groups populated by a more educated
and professional membership compared to mobilizing and organizing interest groups.
This means that the members of mobilizing only interest groups are more likely
than interest groups utilizing both organizing and mobilizing capacities to already be
communicating their interests to legislators. As the membership of interest groups
exercising in mobilizing and organizing may not afford the higher dues necessary to
employ lobbying, they supplement their more institutional tactics with their member-
ships’ sustained engagement. Bearing in mind the Resource Constraint Hypothesis,
this suggests the following:
Organizing and Mobilizing vs Mobilizing Only Interest Group: Collective ac-
tion featuring an organizing and mobilizing interest group is more likely than
that featuring a mobilizing only interest group to receive legislative support.
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For easier reference, each of the expectations regarding the influence of or-
ganizational resource capacity on legislative behavior in response to collective action
are depicted in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Expectations for Organizational Resources and Legislative Support
Reference Category: Reference Category: Reference Category:
No Interest Group Present Organizing and Mobilizing Mobilizing Only
Models I - III Models IV & V Model VI
Organizing Only – – ++ ++
Mobilizing Only – – – –
Organizing and Mobilizing – –
Measuring Legislative Responsiveness to Organiza-
tional Capacity
The Dynamics of Collective Action (DCA) data includes any event reported
in the New York Times fitting the definition of collective action – a public event
involving multiple people expressing a policy concern (McAdam and Su, 2002). Ex-
amples include petitions, letter-writing campaigns, rallies, marches, riots, boycotts,
and strikes. The DCA records the name of up to four organizations present during
a collective action event. Organizations mentioned to have engaged in collective ac-
tion range from public interest law firms to citizens groups to businesses to religious
groups. The primary independent variables relate to the organizational capacity of the
groups participating in collective action events. I use the name of the interest group
and additional information found in the New York Times article on the collective
action event to find information concerning each collective action group’s organizing
and mobilizing capacities. The name of the organization was subsetted from the rest
of the DCA into a new data file during the categorization of interest groups to remove
any information that may bias the classification of organizations. Furthermore, the
presence of more than one interest group during any particular collective action event
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and the participation of some interest groups in multiple locations makes it more
difficult to inadvertently allow my expectations for the data to influence the coding.
Still, future iterations of this analysis will employ coders unaware of the hypotheses
to ensure that the coding of the data does not influence the results.
Information about organizations is readily available from the group’s web-
sites, archives, and media coverage. The Internet Archive: Wayback Machine (lo-
cated at www.archive.org) also provides access to information on older versions of
websites. As the collective action events in this data occurred in the infancy of the
public’s use of the internet, I culled information about interest group’s mobilizing and
organizing capacity from primary and secondary internet sources written or uploaded
within a few years of the collective action event. The wider time frame is used to
gather enough information on the interest groups to make an informed classification
of the groups’ organizational capacity.
Admittedly, much can happen with respect to an interest group’s resource
capacity in the months prior to and following a collective action event. Smaller
organizations grow. Larger ones decline in their membership or staff size. A key
leadership hire can increase an interest group’s mobilizing and/or organizing capacity.
Likewise, internal strife can drastically diminish any organizational capacity that an
interest group once had. Nonetheless, these changes should not bias any empirical
results in favor of particular groups as any over time shifts in organizational capacity
are likely to influence high and low resource groups alike.
The use of the Internet as a source of information about interest groups
may cause concern with respect to the availability of information on each interest
group’s organizational capacity. Any information bias is unlikely to correlate with
legislative success. The issues raised during collective action do not necessarily target
elected officials. Even when they do, the legislation that is being voted on in the
House of Representatives includes various issues that affect multiple groups at once.1
1Recall that a bill does not have to exclusively relate to a collective action claim. It must however
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Legislative support is also not the only measure of interest group success. A group
may be successful if it sufficiently provides voice to its members concerns, if they are
able to get support from their local community, or if they are able to raise funds for
an internal cause. So even if successful groups are more likely to have information
about them online, it is not clear that measure of success should bias the results in
favor of low or high resource groups.
There may exist a relationship between organizational resource disparities
and how much information is available online for each interest group. Associations
with longevity, greater networks, novel tactics, or professional staff are more likely to
receive newspaper coverage and to have concerning their activities available on their
own websites. Therefore, any potential empirical bias will likely be against finding
any advantage in legislative support favoring low resource groups due to a lack of
information about those groups.
On a random sample of 85% of all interest groups in the DCA data, I collected
information about each organization’s membership, staff, finances, tactics, locations,
issue areas, and purpose. Of those 400 interest groups, I was able to find enough in-
formation to make determinations about the group’s organizational resource capacity
for 230 interest groups. Ten groups are excluded because the information available
online did not relate to the time period in which the collective action event occurred.
A list of mobilizing and organizing characteristics developed based on the
previous discussion of extant literature on interest groups’ mobilizing and organiz-
ing capacities is provided in Table 5.3. The categorization of an interest group as
having organizing and/or mobilizing resource capacities is not based on passing any
numerical threshold for any category but rather on whether the characteristic speaks
to the way the organization engages its members. Certain characteristics, like of-
address an issue raised during collective action. When a vote on a roll call bill relating to a collective
action claim occurs, regardless of how complex the bill is there is the possibility that groups could
become aware of a vote (not) in support of the group’s preferences. It is this possibility that forces
legislators to consider being responsive to a salient group.
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fering capacity building activities, encouraging members to be active participants in
the organization, or having a staff or leadership composed primarily or exclusively of
volunteers or community activists, result in the routine classification of an interest
group as have organizing capacity. These activities demonstrate the commitment of
organizing groups to building the capacity of their members to fully participate in
determining the interest groups’ direction, successes, and failures (Han, 2014; Ganz,
2009). If the membership size is large, the primary activity of a membership is paying
dues, or if the staff is composed mainly of professionals, then the group is necessarily
classified as have mobilizing capacity (Skocpol, 2007). Interest groups that habitu-
ally ask members to participate in activities requiring quick, independent tasks are
classified as having mobilizing capacity, while any time or labor intensive (usually
extra-institutional) collective action mentioned for an interest groups leads to that
group being classified as having organizing capacity (Han, 2014).
Table 5.3: Organizational Resource Capacity Characteristics
Mobilizing Characteristics Organizing Characteristics
Dues Paying Membership Volunteering Membership
Instantaneous Membership Involvement Sustained Membership Involvement
Large Budget Small Budget
External Funding No External Funding
Large Staff Small Staff
Professional Staff Lay Staff
Large Membership Size Small Membership Size
Technical Assistance/Services Trainings/Capacity Building Activities
Institutional Tactics Extra-institutional Tactics
(e.g. Lobbying, Research, Petitions) (e.g. Strikes, Marches, Vigils)
The classification of groups as having organizing or mobilizing capacities is
made independently. Consequently, a group could be classified as having mobilizing
and organizing capacities. For example, in the early 1990s the National Organiza-
tion for Women (NOW) had hundreds of thousands dues paying members that were
called on to volunteer and engage in rallying, marching, picketing, civil disobedience,
lobbying, and other efforts. Some of the activities NOW members were asked to par-
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ticipate in were time- and labor-intensive, while others were as effortless as signing
and sending a scripted letter to an elected official.
In the same way that groups could be categorized as having both mobilizing
and organizing capacities, if they did not possess any mobilizing or organizing char-
acteristics, they are classified as not mobilizing and not organizing. On the latter,
interest groups could have no clear organizing or mobilizing capacity but still engage
in collective action. This could be because the interest group was short lived or be-
cause the initiating group was not an interest group, but rather a government entity
or informal group. Due to the peculiarity of the neither category, analyses are not
conducted on these interest groups.
There are four expectations for how organizational resources influence leg-
islative behavior following collective action. The first compares the lack of an interest
group to any interest group. While the neither mobilizing nor organizing category is
excluded from analyses, I use the previously coded No Interest Group Present variable
to represent the lowest organizational resource group. Three variables are created for
each of the interest groups: organizing only, mobilizing only, and organizing and mo-
bilizing interest groups. Each interest group type is coded as a 1 and the reference
category of no interest group present is coded as a 0.
For the expectation comparing organizing only to mobilizing only interest
groups, organizing only is coded as a 1 and mobilizing only is coded as a 0. The next
expectation comparing organizing only interest groups to those with both organizing
and mobilizing capacities is measured with a variable indicated by a 1 if a group
has organizing only capacity and a 0 if they have both organizing and mobilizing
capacities. Finally, mobilizing only interest groups are code as a 1 and organizing
and mobilizing interest groups as a 0 to evaluate the last expectation. The interest
groups and their respective reference categories are indicated in Table 5.4.
The organizational resource capacity data is merged with the DCA data for
multivariate analysis. The unit of observation is a roll call vote by a member of
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Congress on an issue raised by a group during a collective action event occurring
within or near the legislator’s district. As I am interested in the legislative respon-
siveness to particular groups and multiple groups can be participating at an event,
a single vote is sometimes applicable to multiple organizations. Additionally, some
organizations engage in collective action multiple times during a two-year congres-
sional session. Therefore, legislators will have the opportunity to respond to the
same organization multiple times. Consequently, there is an increase in the number
of observations compared to analyses in previous chapters.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of legislative support for
collective action participant grievances. For example, several collective action events
concerned LGBT issues. During the 102nd Congress, the House of Representatives
voted on the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1993 (or HR 6056). A section
of that bill states that “No funds made available pursuant to any provision of this
Act shall be used to implement or enforce any system of registration of unmarried,
cohabiting couples whether they are homosexual, lesbian, or heterosexual . . . ”.
While this bill only has implications for the District of Columbia, it explicitly mentions
homosexuals and lesbians. Therefore, any vote on this legislation is a symbolic vote for
or against LGBT rights more generally. Legislators could suffer electoral repercussions
for their vote from constituents on either side of the issue should the vote become
publicized. For anti-gay collective action events, the dependent variable is coded as a
1 in support of collective action participants’ policy stance if a legislator representing
a district where such events occur voted in support of HR 6056, and 0 otherwise.
The analysis is conducted on events reported in the New York Times from 1991 to
1995. Additionally, only events on issues concerning Civil Rights, Minority Issues,
and Civil Liberties and for which there was a final passage roll call vote in the House
of Representatives during the congressional session in which the event occurred are
included in the analysis.
Other independent variables and congressional district fixed effects are also
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included in each of the models comparing interest group organizational capacity to
address any legislative, personal, or other constituency pressures that may influence
the legislator’s decision to vote in support or opposition to issues raised during col-
lective action. These variables include district level Public Salience for Civil Rights,
Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties; the district’s median levels of Education and
Income; and the district’s Percent Black and Percent Latino voting age populations.
Additionally, I incorporate the legislator’s party (Democratic Representative), Rela-
tive Voting Record, Length of Service, status as an Incumbent, Margin of Victory in
the previous election, race, and gender. Finally, I include whether the congressional
district in which the collective action occurred presides in a Southern State.
Organizational Capacity and Legislative Bias
Taking this more nuanced view of organizational resource capacity reveals
that the lower resource advantage is more nuanced than the initial finding concerning
organizational resource capacity on legislative behavior might suggest. The first three
models in Table 5.4 analyze whether not having a formal interest group present at a
collective action event is more likely to produce legislative support than a collective
action event where any formal interest group is present. The theoretical expectations
only receive empirical support in Model II. Legislators are more likely to support
collective action not featuring an interest group only when compared to collective
action featuring mobilizing only interest groups. Otherwise, legislators are more likely
to support any interest group with organizational resource capacity than they are to
support collective action not featuring an interest group. Each of these coefficients
are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
The log odds coefficient on Organizing Only in Model IV suggests that there
may be little difference between organizing only interest groups and interest groups
with organizing and mobilizing capacities. While the log odds coefficient is negative,
98
it fails to meet any conventional levels of statistical significance. Moreover, the rela-
tionships between both of the organizing resource types and each other organizational
resource capacities are similar. Subsequent models corroborate the advantage of or-
ganizing interests groups and the disadvantage of mobilizing only interest groups in
receiving legislative support following collective action. Models V and VI in Table
5.4 reveal that mobilizing only interest groups are less likely than organizing and mo-
bilizing and organizing only interest groups, respectively to receive legislative support
for issues raised during collective action. Both of those coefficients reach conventional
levels of statistical significance.
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Table 5.4: Organizational Resources and Legislative Support
Reference Category: Reference Category: Reference Category:
No Interest Group Present Organizing and Mobilizing Mobilizing Only
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Organizing Only 0.389∗∗∗ -0.368 1.096∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.245) (0.194)
Mobilizing Only -1.124∗∗∗ -2.798∗∗∗
(0.0974) (0.214)
Organizing and Mobilizing 0.307∗∗
(0.136)
Public Salience -2.880∗∗∗ -2.836∗∗∗ -2.748∗∗∗ -0.242 3.671 -2.370
(0.318) (0.316) (0.323) (3.667) (3.264) (3.210)
Education -0.347 -0.356 -0.868∗∗ -1.867 -4.249∗ -1.235
(0.399) (0.398) (0.401) (2.546) (2.300) (2.271)
Income 1.416∗∗∗ 1.646∗∗∗ 1.857∗∗∗ 2.376 5.856∗∗ 5.046∗∗
(0.337) (0.337) (0.341) (2.521) (2.530) (2.152)
Percent Black -3.960∗∗∗ -3.681∗∗∗ -4.574∗∗∗ -1.581 1.489 -8.408
(0.943) (0.931) (0.946) (6.876) (6.455) (5.265)
Percent Latino -0.832 -0.856 -1.080 -1.404 0.761 -3.692
(1.112) (1.107) (1.118) (8.129) (6.691) (6.449)
Democratic Representative 1.151∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 1.931 1.292 2.692∗∗
(0.242) (0.241) (0.245) (1.446) (1.239) (1.254)
Relative Voting Record -1.099∗∗ -1.243∗∗∗ -0.105 -2.400 -2.690 -4.346∗
(0.469) (0.472) (0.476) (2.908) (2.782) (2.599)
Length of Service -0.322 -0.323 -0.809∗∗ -0.760 -3.120 1.252
(0.393) (0.392) (0.395) (2.606) (2.304) (2.274)
Incumbent -0.495∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗ -2.634∗∗∗ -1.070∗∗ -1.014∗∗
(0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.659) (0.516) (0.499)
Margin of Victory 0.734∗ 0.797∗∗ 0.627 -0.359 -0.636 -0.245
(0.393) (0.387) (0.393) (1.969) (1.685) (1.740)
Black Representative 0.930∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.157 -0.609 2.308
(0.376) (0.372) (0.376) (2.718) (2.457) (2.190)
Latino Representative 0.534 0.665∗ 0.443 -0.583 -0.761 2.336
(0.385) (0.383) (0.385) (2.786) (2.425) (2.314)
Female Representative -0.159 -0.105 -0.205 0.435 -0.617 -2.577∗∗
(0.195) (0.194) (0.196) (1.424) (1.318) (1.263)
Southern State -1.414 -2.808∗ -0.892 -2.986 -0.937 -5.873∗∗∗
(0.874) (1.628) (0.882) (2.432) (3.013) (2.139)
Constant 0.591 1.334 0.531 4.691∗ 4.160 0.721
(0.645) (1.216) (0.645) (2.816) (2.580) (2.055)
Congressional District Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10469 10683 10563 743 1161 937
Log likelihood -5054.8 -5422.0 -4996.0 -263.4 -487.9 -419.3
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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The substantive effects calculated from the models in Table 5.4 are displayed
in Figure 5.2. Each bar in the figure reflects the difference in the predicted proba-
bilities of legislative support given the organizational resource capacity of collective
action participants. For ease of interpretation, the higher resource group is the ref-
erence category in each of the bars such that any positive relationship (above the
dashed line where y=0) suggests support for the Resource Constraint Hypothesis and
any bar below that line offers less support for the theoretical expectations. Confi-
dence intervals are placed on each bar to indicate when the differences in the predicted
probabilities of legislative support are statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level.
Figure 5.2: Organizational Resources and Legislative Support
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Note: Difference in the predicted probability of legislative support of low resource group relative to
high resource group based on the models in Table 5.4. All covariates are held at their means.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates that, contrary to expectations, collective action not
featuring an interest group is 9% less likely to gain legislative support than orga-
nizing only interest groups’ collective action and 7% less likely to gain legislative
support than interest groups possessing organizing and mobilizing capacities. These
differences are substantively and statistically significant.
Stronger support for the Resource Constraint Hypothesis is present in the
second, fifth, and sixth bars. Not having an interest group present at a collective
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action event is almost 22% more likely to lead to legislative support than having
a mobilizing only interest group at an event. Organizing and mobilizing interest
groups are 50% more likely to receive legislative support following collective action
than mobilizing only interest groups. Moreover, organizing only interest groups are
22% more likely to gain legislative support than mobilizing only interest groups. All
of these substantive differences are statistically significant. They also reveal that
the biggest differences in legislative support arise with respect to mobilizing only
interest groups. While mobilizing only interest groups have the greatest financial and
professional resources and are most likely to represent higher resource members, they
are consistently and substantially less likely to receive legislative support following
collective action than each of their lower resource counterparts. Futhermore, all of
these relationships hold given other legislative considerations, like party, constituency
pressures and legislators’ own personal preferences.
On Organizational Resource Capacity and Legisla-
tive Behavior
Kollman (1998) and Gillion (2013) have potentially competing perspectives
on how legislators perceive interest groups when viewing collection action. According
to Kollman (1998), legislators prefer to support events that require less effort to
initiate because it is a clearer indication of the group’s true salience for the issue. If
people are willing to show up for a collective action event without being enticed to
do so then they will be even more willing to show up to punish or reward a legislator
during an election if they become aware of a vote against or for their interests.
Gillion (2013), on the other hand, argues that the presence of a formal organi-
zation, at least relative to the lack of any formal interest group, signals to a legislator
that participation is legitimate and worthy of representation. A legislator assumes
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that an organization would not devote its resources to mobilizing participation if it
did not believe that the issue was truly salient to their members. This is particularly
true if the organization wished to be perceived as authentic in future interactions with
the legislator. Even more, that an organization can instigate individuals to partici-
pate in collective action suggests to a legislator that the mobilization could reoccur at
a more critical electoral junction. While individuals may become distracted by daily
obligations and personal responsibilities, it is the job of formal interest groups to
remain focused on representing the interests of their members. So, even if collective
action participants are misrepresenting the true salience of a legislator’s constituency,
the legislator is more likely to respond to such participation if a formal interest group
is present.
As in previous expectations for the effect of resources and salience on legisla-
tive responsiveness, I argue that legislators will reward collective action (even when
not politically focused) by lower resource groups and discount participation by higher
resource groups. Equal levels of revealed salience suggests that lower resource, po-
litically marginalized groups may actually care more about the issue since they were
able to overcome greater barriers to participation for similar amounts of participation.
Additionally, higher resource groups, who are more likely to participate electorally
because they do not face as many participation barriers, communicate their prefer-
ences and the intensity of those preferences more often to legislators. Their interests
are also more likely to be represented by legislators, which decreases the perceived
threat that precipitates most collective action.
When comparing grassroots collective action to the presence of any interest
group, empirical support is established for the Resource Constraint Hypothesis and
for the Kollman (1998) perspective. The lack of a formal interest group at a collective
action event is more likely than having an interest group present to gain legislative
support following collective action. However, moving beyond a dichotomous relation-
ship of having or not having an interest group suggests that these two prospectives
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may not be completely at odds.
Interest groups engage in collective action at different rates. They differ
in their institutional networks, financial arrangements, and organizational structure.
They also vary in the extent of the mobilizing or organizing efforts. Each of these
factors are meaningful for the perception among legislators of the salience of par-
ticipants’ concerns and they also speak to the legitimacy of the group’s concerns.
Legislators may perceive legitimacy based on an interest group’s organizing capacity
and the group’s proclivity to encourage active participation and sustained, personal
interactions with their participants. Legitimacy can also be found in the group’s
mobilizing characteristics. Mobilizing interest groups acquire legitimacy within the
conventional networks traveled by professional staff or external sponsors. They main-
tain legitimacy during sustained communication between those staff, sponsors, and
the legislator.
The results presented here suggest that while mobilizing interest groups ben-
efit from their engagement in other types of participation, their collective action is less
likely to gain legislative support than grassroots efforts (e.g Kollman, 1998). Never-
theless, when comparing grassroots collective action to other interest groups besides
mobilizing only groups, the presence of an interest group is more likely to result in
legislative support than grassroots efforts (e.g. Gillion, 2013). This suggests that
while legislators appreciate the costly, authentic nature of grassroots efforts as a sig-
nal of the group’s true salience for an issue, they prefer the legitimacy that organizing
interest groups bring to collective action.
The empirical results in this chapter complicate but do not necessarily chal-
lenge the Resource Constraint Hypothesis. While, collective action featuring orga-
nizing interest groups – and not collective action devoid of an interest group – is
most likely to gain legislative support, organizing interest groups also represent a
low resource group. Organizing interest groups, like the Human Rights Watch, Ur-
ban League, and Save Our Homeless People Association, tend to represent racial and
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ethnic minorities, the poor, and other low resource groups that rely on collective
action for representation. They ask their members and supporters to actively partici-
pate because human capital is their most accessible resource. Earth First!, American
Disabled for Attendant Programs Today (ADAPT), Housing Works, and other orga-
nizing interest groups engage their members as leaders in the effort to bring attention
to their politically marginalized, salient concerns. Certainly, while organizing inter-
est groups may not be the lowest resource collective action groups, they are a low
resource group engaging in costly collective action.
A stronger threat to the Resource Constraint Hypothesis would be if mobi-
lizing only interest groups were more likely to gain legislative support than any of
other organizational resource groups. Yet, mobilizing only interest groups are consis-
tently least likely than any other collective action group to gain legislative support.
Even more, the largest differences in legislative support arise when comparing the
likelihood of legislative support for mobilizing only interest groups to other collective
action groups. Mobilizing only interest groups are not simply less likely to receive leg-
islatively support, but they are far behind other groups in gaining legislative support
for their interests, at least following collective action. These findings suggest that the
NFWA may not be as exceptional as Ganz (2009) might suggest. The Davids of the
world more than just sometimes win in gaining legislative support following collective
action.
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CHAPTER VI
The Difference Two Decades Make
“It seems like it is easier than ever to get people engaged
in the twenty-first century, and the political process
seems more open to citizen input.
People power, perhaps, is on the rise.”
- Hahrie Han 2014, p. 3
On March 28, 2012, Congressman Bobby Rush provocatively donned a hooded
sweatshirt before the United States House of Representatives. Explaining his actions,
Rush told CNBC, “The floor of the House . . . should not ever be disconnected nor
distant from the cries of the American people for justice. That’s one of the reasons I
wore the hoodie to the floor.”1 The hoodie was a symbol for protests held throughout
the nation as groups expressed outrage over the delayed arrest and later failed convic-
tion of George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watchman who killed teenager Trayvon
Martin after fearing him to be suspicious. While the death of Trayvon was the impe-
tus for this specific protest, the events embodied a larger dissatisfaction over current
and historical injustice for African Americans. Rush elaborated, “I’m outraged be-
cause this pattern [of black men being racially profiled] has existed in this nation for a
long time . . . I wore a hoodie because I wanted to identify with [the demonstrators]
and tell them to keep demonstrating, because be it not for them we wouldn’t even be
discussing Trayvon Martin.”
1Retrieved on March 23, 2014 from http://www.cnbc.com/id/46886308.
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Collective action is a public form of non-electoral participation that involves
multiple participants professing a desire for some policy-related outcome (McAdam
and Su, 2002). These events involve familiar protest events like rallies, marches, and
demonstrations; and, more conventional participation including petitions, lobbying,
and letter-writing campaigns. One virtue of collective action is that it can inform
policymakers about their constituency (Gillion, 2013; Kollman, 1998). This informa-
tion can enhance responsiveness and is pertinent for public officials wishing to avoid
political repercussions on Election Day (Arnold, 1990). Surprisingly, there have been
relatively few empirical studies demonstrating the influence of collective action on
legislative decision-making (e.g. Gillion, 2013; McAdam and Su, 2002). There is even
less focus on how the influence of collective action on legislative behavior varies across
the resource levels of diverse participants.
The goal of this project is to examine the moderating effect of resources in
the relationship between public opinion and representation. Particularly, I analyze
whether legislators are more likely to reflect the interests of higher or lower resourced
collective action participants in their roll call voting behavior following collective ac-
tion. The theory of legislative bias expects that legislators are more likely to represent
the interests of lower resource groups than higher resource collective action partici-
pants because they want to represent the interests of groups who care enough about
an issue to reward or punish the legislator during the next reelection. For groups faced
with less flexible time, little money, inadequate transportation, and other resources
pertinent for participation, collective action is more difficult to mobilize. However,
when issue salience is high, the desire for action grows more urgent and the ability
to participate becomes more likely for infrequent participators. This bias in favor of
low resource collective action participants is robust to the measurement of resources,
the nature of collective action, the type of legislator, and the characteristics of the
group’s organizational capacity, at least according to data for the 102nd, 103rd, and
104th Congresses.
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The Data
The data for this dissertation relies heavily on the Dynamics of Collective
Action (DCA) database – a compilation of collective action events reported in the
New York Times. While comprehensive, the DCA is limited to collective action events
reported 1960 to 1995. I used GIS to code the congressional district that overlaps
with the collective action events, but the data necessary for this coding was until
recently only publicly available beginning 1991 to present. Although I confine the
analysis to 1991-1995, extrapolating those results to current legislative behavior may
not be appropriate. To be sure, contemporary collective action has taken somewhat
of a more online presence, the House of Representatives is now more ethnically and
racially diverse, the electoral participation of racial and ethnic groups is beginning to
comport with that of white voters, and the election of the nation’s first black president
has lead some to coin the nation “post-racial” implying that racial discrimination is no
longer significant. These trends could have implications for the relationship between
resources, collective action, and representation.
Even more, the DCA is limited in its geographical scope. The New York
Times is biased towards events occurring in major cities like New York, California,
and Washington, DC. If we are interested in the influence of collective action on
congressional behavior, then the scope of the analysis must be on the events to which
legislators are likely to respond. To be clear, a legislator is North Carolina is less
likely to respond to a protest in Times Square than if the event occurred at the
State’s Capitol building and a regional newspaper is more likely than the New York
Times to cover the North Carolina event. In an attempt to expose the extent of
the data’s limitations, with the help of undergraduate research assistants, I created
a dataset of collective action events that occurred in 2012 and were covered in the
newspaper with the largest circulation in the 20 largest United States metropolitan
areas.
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Description of New Data Collection
The DCA codebook meticulously details the data collection and coding pro-
cess that generated the 1960-1995 data. I use this information as a guide for the
collection and coding of collective action events for 2012. In generating the initial
data, coders manually searched the New York Times for instances of and information
concerning collective action events. The new data is derived from Factiva, an online
newspaper archive. Accordingly, there is some dissimilarity in the coding procedures.
The first step in the data collection process is to gather all newspaper articles
from 2012 potentially relating to collective action. This is done by conducting a
comprehensive Factiva boolean search. In developing the boolean search, I scanned
the DCA codebook and data for all code words relevant to collective action events.
I paid most attention to the title of the articles, the type of collective action listed,
and characteristics of the event (eg, violence, brutality, multiple arrests). The goal
is to be as inclusive as possible to avoid excluding appropriate articles. I then tested
the search on Factiva for a period covered by the DCA data. I found that around 90
percent of the articles present in the DCA were identical to those found by the Factiva
boolean search. The majority of collective action events not found by the boolean
search were reported in the other newspapers (i.e., not the New York Times).
The abundance of terms used to create the effective boolean search also pro-
duced many false positives including obituaries, recipes, and other articles fitting the
search terms but irrelevant to the definition of collective action for the target year,
2012. For example, an article may mention the 1963 March on Washington or the 300
student-athletes recognized in a March edition of a newspaper. The former should
be excluded from the sample since it does not fall within the date range. The lat-
ter should be excluded because while ”March” is a relevant collective action term,
the usage of the word refers to a date; it is not a collective action event. Research
assistants skim each article obtained in the search to exclude false positives.
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Finally, research assistants code each article following the DCA coding man-
ual, which collects data on 76 variables. The coding produces rich information on the
time, date, and location of the event; the demographics of participants; the specific
type of event; the amount and type of violence, arrest, and police action associated
with the event; the target; the purpose or impetus for the activity and a multitude
of other information. Additionally, research assistants code for whether the event
occurred online. Understanding this new data in comparison to the 1991-1995 data
provides insights into what to expect regarding current legislative responsiveness to
collective action.
Comparing the Data
A preliminary look at collective action across time suggests that contempo-
rary collective action may not be much different than that occurring over twenty years
ago. As Figure 6.1 reveals, the New York Times covered 245 collective action events
in 2012 and averaged just over 300 collective action events in 1991 through 1995.
While there are many forces that can explain the ebbs and flow of collective action,
including constituents’ level of contentment and feelings of efficacy, this first look at
the frequency of collective action suggests that there were about as many collective
action events in 2012 as there were in the initial analyses. So if there are differences
in contemporary legislative behavior in response to collective action, those differences
are not likely due to the frequency of events.
While considering the frequency of events, it is important to note that the
New York Times does fail to cover a lot of collective action. Only 16% of collective
action events in the 2012 data were reported by the New York Times. This may
trigger cause for concern about the representativeness of the New York Times data;
however, further examination of the 2012 data demonstrates that any concern may
be unfounded. Figure 6.2 looks at any disparities in newspaper coverage based on
the nature of collective action. This figure shows that the New York Times covers
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Figure 6.1: Frequency of Collective Action Across Time
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similar collective action as other events. The New York Times gives slightly more
coverage to rallies and less coverage to petitions and letter-writing campaigns that
other newspapers, but the differences are small.
Figure 6.2: Comparing Newspaper Coverage by Type of Events
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There may be disparities in news coverage with respect to the race or ethnic-
ity of the participants. Figure 6.3 shows that compared to other newspapers, the New
York Times ’s coverage of collective action events underrepresents collective action by
black participants but gives a larger portion of its coverage to collective action fea-
turing Latinos. So, while the frequency and nature of collective action does not differ
much when comparing the New York Times to other newspapers, there are differences
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in the participants likely to receive coverage in newspapers. These differences have
implications for the empirical tests of legislative bias using the DCA data, which rely
exclusively on New York Times coverage of collective action. The newspaper data
serves as a proxy for information that legislators have concerning collective action
in their districts; but legislators depend on more than just newspaper coverage for
that information. The fact that the New York Times misrepresents the occurrence of
collective action based, at least partly, on who is participating means that the empir-
ical results in this dissertation may underestimate the influence of collective action
on legislative behavior. The New York Times ’ coverage also distorts the incidence of
collective action taking place online.
Figure 6.3: Comparing Newspaper Coverage by Race of Participants
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Figure 6.1 demonstrates that the 2012 data collection process uncovers some
collective action events and may elucidate some influence of online collective action
on legislative behavior. About 10% of the collective action events reported in the
nation’s largest newspapers occurred online. This data likely reflects a gross underes-
timate of online collective action. The majority of online events in the 2012 data are
rallies or petitions that were organized or conducted online (See Figure 6.4). Missing
from this data are various online petitions promoted on change.org and other web-
sites, and the numerous hashtag collective action campaigns including #Kony2012,
#BringBackOurGirls, and #JusticeforTrayvon. Indeed, over the last two decades,
the internet has evolved from being a novel technology to being a staple for the or-
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dinary citizen. Social networking sites, personal blogs, public and private web pages,
and apps facilitate collective action and have implications for the nature, coverage,
and influence of contemporary collective action.
Figure 6.4: Frequency of Collective Action Across Time
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On Contemporary Collective Action and Legislative
Behavior
In 2015, hundreds of collective action events saturated the nation’s newspa-
pers, television outlets, and social networking pages. The year began with a contin-
uation of marches, petitions, and rallies calling for accountability for police officers
and the valuation of black lives. Other events marking the year included Confed-
erate flag rallies in South Carolina and Mississippi and nationwide demonstrations
against fast food companies. By year’s end, collective action was erupting across the
nation at universities and colleges with students exposing racism and calling for a
more inclusive community.
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Recent responses to the protests following the failed indictments of police-
men involved in the deaths Mike Brown and Eric Garner suggest that collective action
presents an opportunity for constituents with fewer resources to receive policy support
from their elected officials. For example, in December 2014, Congress reauthorized
The Death in Custody Reporting Act (2000), which requires local law enforcement
agencies to report any death occurring while in police custody to the federal gov-
ernment. The President also asked Congress to authorize funds to improve police
training and provide officers with body cameras. While these efforts are criticized
for being “too narrow and potentially ineffective”, they do show that elected officials
are acknowledging and attempting to address concerns raised by collective action
participants.
This work demonstrates that members of Congress do not respond equally
to events occurring within their district. Legislators are generally more likely to
represent the interests of lower resource groups than their higher resource counterparts
following collective action. This argument finds robust theoretical and empirical
support.
The formal theory of legislative bias presented in Chapter II is an adaption of
a costly signaling model featuring an interest group of two types (high or low salience)
and a legislator desiring to represent the salient interests of her constituents. The
group sends a signal concerning its issue salience level to the legislator by engaging
in collective action. That signal could be misrepresenting the group’s true salience
level in order to gain legislative support. Understanding the fallibility of the signal,
the legislator considers the resource level of the group. As lower resource groups face
greater burdens in achieving collective action, the legislator is more likely to believe
that lower resource groups have high levels of salience for an issue when they are able
to engage in collective action.
I refine the theory of legislative bias in Chapter IV to verify that legislative
bias in favor of low resource groups exists regardless of the type of legislator represent-
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ing constituents. The theoretical model considers the voting behavior of two types of
legislators: maximizers and maintainers. The legislative behaviors are distinguished
by the legislators electoral context, which determines legislators’ susceptibility to con-
stituency pressures. Vote maximizing legislators behave to maximize their subjective
estimate of their current probability of reelection. The theory proposes that vote
maximizers’ aspiration to represent the most salient concerns of their constituents
leads vote maximizers to demonstrate a larger bias than other legislators in favor
of low resource collective action participants. Vote maintainers are secure in their
subjective estimate of their current probability of reelection, so they do not actively
seek to win additional electoral support. However, even vote maintaining legislators
are expected to be as likely, and sometimes more than likely, to favor low resource
participants in their roll call voting behavior.
Chapters III through VI empirically support the predictions of the formal
theory. In Chapter III, I find that no matter how resource capacity is measured,
legislators are more likely to legislatively support concerns raised during collective
action by low resource collective action participants. Poor participants, and racial
and ethnic minorities are more likely than non-poor groups and white participants
to gain legislative support following collective action. Additionally, grassroots col-
lective action and that featuring extra-institutional tactics, like marches, rallies, and
demonstrations, are advantaged over collective action featuring formal interest groups
and institutional tactics, like petitioning, letter-writing campaigns, and lobbying, re-
spectively. This legislative bias in favor of low resource groups remains even when
considering other characteristics of collective action known to influence legislative be-
havior, including media attention, the number of participants at a collective action
event, and the collective action’s level of disruptiveness.
Chapter V empirically assesses the legislative responsiveness of vote maximiz-
ing and vote maintaining legislators to black and white collective action participants.
Specifically, I compare legislators with differing lengths of service, electoral margins
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of victory, and partisanship. For each of these empirical models, legislators are at
least marginally more likely to support black collective action participants over white
collective action participants. The bias in favor of black collective action participants
is larger and more often meets conventional levels of statistical significance among
vote maximizing legislators.
Chapter VI moves beyond the dichotomous empirical examinations of re-
source capacities while exploring the influence of organizational resources on legisla-
tive behavior. The findings mostly comport with what is uncovered in other chapters.
Legislators are more likely to support grassroots collective action than they are to
support collective action featuring an interest group, except for when the interest
group has organizing resource capacities. The highest resource, mobilizing only in-
terest groups are consistently and substantially less likely than their lower resource
counterparts to receive legislative support for participants’ interests following collec-
tive action.
Together, these theoretical and empirical findings demonstrate that even
when controlling for characteristics of a collective action event, considering a mem-
ber’s electoral context, or delving deeper into organizational resource capacity, legis-
lators are generally more likely to favor low resource groups in their roll call voting
following collective action. Still some doubt may remain that the conclusions reached
here are generalizable to periods beyond this analysis.
Perhaps the 102nd, 103rd and 104th Congresses were different than those
that preceded it or those that follow. In recent years, the participating electorate has
become more ethnically and racially diverse, the difference in black and white electoral
participation rates is becoming insignificant due to the campaign of the first black
president (Lopez and Taylor, 2009) and electoral reforms that mitigate participation
obstacles (Leighley and Nagler, 2014). Yet, that trend could change considering that
the nation’s first black president will soon be leaving the nation’s highest political of-
fice and given that the electoral reforms that increased participation are under attack
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or have been repealed in many states. Notwithstanding shifts in electoral participa-
tion rates, collective action events surrounding living wages, voter suppression laws,
police brutality, and access to health care suggest that racial and ethnic minorities,
the poor, and other lower resource groups still feel politically marginalized and are
still communicating their salient interests to legislators through collective action.
As the country has become more diverse, so has the House of Representatives,
albeit at slower rates. Comparing the institutional incentives might suggest different
levels of responsiveness by current legislators than that revealed in this analysis.
The current Congresses have been functioning under divided government just as the
102nd through 104th Congresses were. However, Democrats controlled the House
in the 102nd under divided government, but with unified government in the 103rd
Congress.
The advent of the internet may also cause some concern for the credibility
of these findings for understanding current legislative responsiveness to collective ac-
tion. The internet produces both advantages and disadvantages for the influence of
collective action on legislative behavior. On one hand, the internet makes it eas-
ier to organize large numbers of people for an event. Instead of knocking on doors,
attending church, or organizing during office meetings, mobilizers can virtually en-
ter individuals’ work, home, and cell phone environments to arrange and advertise
collective action events. The internet also provides a platform where participants
can publicize and clarify their concerns without having to rely upon the goodwill
of a news reporter or a proficient, recognized leader. On the other hand, with the
increased independence that the internet provides online collective action lacks the
legitimacy and direction that a central leader or experienced journalist could provide
a movement. It is much more difficult to communicate a salient concern or grievance
when multiple voices are competing to speak for the group. Furthermore, the ease
of mobilizing collective action via the internet removes the costliness that makes col-
lective action informative for legislative decision making. As such, an over-reliance
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on online collective action will likely decrease the effectiveness of collective action in
influencing legislative behavior.
Notwithstanding, I still expect the legislative bias in favor of lower resource
collective action participants to hold. The formal theory, which is not temporally
restrained, demonstrates that regardless of the particular tactic, or a legislator’s elec-
toral context, reelection-minded legislators have incentives to be biased in favor of
representing the most marginalized constituents within their districts following col-
lective action. The likelihood of legislative responsiveness increases when legislators
view costly participation by their constituents.
Contributions
In exploring the differential legislative responses to collective action by par-
ticipants of various resource levels, this project contributes to an immense literature
dedicated to understanding the determinants of legislative voting behavior (c.f. Hall
and Deardorff, 2006; Aldrich, 1995; Arnold, 1990). It furthers the theoretical foun-
dations of this debate by demonstrating the benefits of exploring collection action -
a source of constituency influence beyond voting and preferences acquired through
public opinion surveys. Still, this is not the first work to focus on the influence of
collective action on legislative behavior.
Previous research finds that collective action can provide incentives for legis-
lators to engage in bargaining (Gamson, 1975; Lipsky, 1968) that benefits marginal-
ized groups. Empirical support for these claims are found in more recent work on
legislative behavior. McAdam and Su (2002) asserts that antiwar protest positively
shifts congressional voting behavior during the Vietnam War. Additionally, (Gillion,
2013) finds that collective action leads to responsive legislative behavior, at least with
respect to the influence of collective action for minority interests on the roll call votes
of legislators representing districts in which collective action occurs. This projects
builds upon the scholarship on the influence of collective action on legislative behav-
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ior by focusing on the differential representation of advantaged and disadvantaged
populations. In this effort, this work contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the
existence and extent of legislative bias in the representation of sub-constituencies.
The findings of the formal and empirical models complicate what is currently
known about differential legislative responsiveness to constituents with disparate re-
source capacities. To be sure, legislators are generally more responsive to requests
from white constituents than black constituents (Butler and Broockman, 2011) and
are more likely to favor affluent constituents over the less affluent (Bartels, 2008) given
similar levels of contact. Additionally, legislators are most likely to hear the concerns
of constituents with the resources to make more frequent, informed contact (Miler,
2007). Conventional and theoretical wisdom alike would lead one to believe that racial
and ethnic minorities and the poor are consistently disadvantaged in policymaking.
While this may be the case, there are reasons to believe that lower resources groups
sometimes win (Hacker and Pierson, 2002; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Gamson, 1975;
Lipsky, 1970, 1968). This research adds to the latter faction. While collective action
may be more influential for lower resource groups, the analyses suggest that collective
action only mitigates the biases that politically marginalize these groups.
Furthermore, this work deepens our understanding of tactical resource dis-
parities in analyzing whether legislators view disruptive events as legitimate, infor-
mation conveying participation worthy of representation. The findings suggest that
while some low resource groups are more likely to be stereotyped as disruptive when
they engage in collective action, this stigmatization does not remove the influence
of collective action on legislative behavior. Legislative bias in favor of low resource
groups persists even when events are disruptive.
This dissertation provides a lens to view the collective action events that
flood our televisions, radios, and newspapers. The findings suggest that collective
action not only provides a voice to the discontent, but it also presents a widely
unrecognized opportunity for communication between constituents and legislators.
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While legislators may have various motivations for casting votes, including altruism
and personal ambitions, the desire for reelection incentivizes legislators to represent
the truly salient concerns of their constituents. Who is initiating the communication
is as important, and maybe more important, for legislative responsiveness than any
other characteristic of a collective action event. Legislative responsiveness to collective
action by the politically marginalized results in an advantage for the disadvantaged
constituents within a district.
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APPENDIX A
Formal Model Proof
There is a set of semi-pooling equilibria that address the model’s main hypothesis. Semi-
pooling equilibria occur when one or both players mix between strategies. These equilibria are
particularly interesting because they allow for comparative statics and they express the conditions
under which legislative support following collective action is likely.
Actors
The model consists of two actors. The group, G, sends a signal communicating whether it
has high or low salience for an issue (Gt=h or Gt=l). The sender’s type, or salience level, is private
information to the group and is determined exogenously by nature or some player or event not
involved in this interaction. The receiver is a legislator, L, who places a probability, λ, on the belief
that the group is a high type, and, 1 − λ, on the prior belief that the group is a low type. Both
players are aware of this probability.
Actions
The group moves first anticipating the legislator’s rational decision-making. The group
wants to increase the probability of gaining legislative support without ever engaging in collective
action (CA) since collective action is costly. Costs to engage in collective action are higher for low
resource groups than they are for high resource groups. Accordingly, a high salience type group
(Gt=h) always chooses collective action (CA), a low salience group (Gt=l) chooses collective action
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(CA) with probability α and a low salience group (Gt=l) chooses no collective action (¬CA) with
probability 1− α.
After the group moves, the legislator takes an action a ∈ {y, n}. With this action, the
legislator informs the group whether she is supporting the group’s policy preference. The legislator
would prefer to support a group that provides her with more electoral support without discouraging
existing support. Therefore, she would prefer to support a high salience group over a low salience
group. The legislator wants to increase the probability of legislative support for a high salience
interest group (Gt=h). She wants to persuade highly salient interest groups to engage in collective
action so that she may gain more information and better predict and mitigate potentially negative
electoral consequences. So, for the legislator, she never supports the policy after seeing no collective
action, she supports the policy after seeing collective action with probability γ, and does not support
the policy after seeing collective action with probability 1 − γ. After observing the group’s action,
her posterior beliefs are that with probability σ, the group is a high salience type (Gt=h), and 1−σ,
the group is a low salience type (Gt=l).
Players’ Utility
The group has the following utility:
UG = at− CˆA(Cr)
In this utility function, the group receives a positive payoff if the legislator chooses to
legislatively support the group a = y. But, the group only receives this payoff if the group places
high importance on receiving policy support (Gt=h). When a = n, the group receives a non-positive
utility from engaging in collective action. Collective action is costly so when the group engages in
collective action it pays a cost (CˆA). The group does not pay the cost if it has sufficiently high
resource levels such that it does not feel the costs of engaging in collective action (ie, Cr=H=0 and
Cr=L = 1).
The legislator’s utility function is specified as follows:
UL = a(t− k)
When choosing how to respond to collective action, a legislator considers the consequences
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of each of her actions. Supporting a high salience interest group (Gt=h) results in a higher payoff
than supporting a low salience interest group (Gt=l). When the group’s salience is high (Gt=h), she
receives a positive payoff for supporting the group (a=y) and no payoff if she opposes the group
(a=n). When the group’s salience is low (Gt=h), she receives 0 payoff for not supporting the group.
Choosing to support a group also results in a cost (k∼U[0,1]).
Strategies
1. Probability(CA|Gt=h) = 1
For Gt=h to pursue this strategy,
UIGh(CA) ≥ UIGh(¬CA)
γ(1(1)− (1)Cr) + (1− γ)(0(1)− (1)Cr) ≥ 0(1)− Cr(0)
γ(1− Cr) + (1− γ)(−Cr) ≥ 0
γ − γCr − Cr + γCr ≥ 0
γ − Cr ≥ 0
γ ≥ Cr
2. Probability(CA|Gt=l) = α, where α = λ(1−k)k(l−λ)
For Gt=l to pursue this strategy, it must be indifferent between CA and ¬CA.
UIGl(CA) = UIGl(¬CA)
γ(1(0)− (1)Cr) + (1− γ)(0(0)− (1)Cr) = 0(0)− Cr(0)
−γCr − Cr + γCr = 0
−Cr = 0
0 = Cr
3. For L, Probability(y|CA) = γ, where γ ≥ Cr.
For L to pursue her strategy, she must be indifferent between y|CA and n|CA.
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UL(y|CA) = UL(n|CA)
σ(1(1− k)) + (1− σ)(1(0− k)) = 0
σ − σk − k + σk = 0
σ − k = 0
σ = k
4. Probability(n|¬CA) = 1
For L to pursue this strategy,
UL(y|¬CA) ≤ UL(n|¬CA)
ρ(1− k) + (1− ρ)(−k) ≤ 0
ρ− ρk − k + ρk ≤ 0
ρ ≤ k
5. L must update beliefs after seeing G action.
p(h|CA) = p(CA|h)p(h)
p(CA|h)p(h) + p(CA|l)p(l)
σ =
1(λ)
1(λ) + α(1− λ)
k = σ =
λ
λ+ α− αλ
kλ+ αk − αkλ = λ
αk(1− λ) = λ− kλ
α =
λ(1− k)
k(l − λ)
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APPENDIX B
Minority Issue Areas
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Minority Policy Issue Areas as Listed in the Policy Agendas 
Project Topics Codebook 
 
The following are issue as listed in the Policy Agendas Project Topic Codebook. Minority 
issue areas were chosen based on the definition in Gillion (2012). These issue areas are 
most relevant to the Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties claims used to 
identify bills for the dependent variable of Legislative support used in the analyses 
conducted for this paper. The complete codebook, with examples of each issue area is 
available at http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook.  	  
 
2. Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties  
200: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics) 
201: Ethnic Minority and Racial Group Discrimination 
202: Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
204: Age Discrimination 
205: Handicap or Disease Discrimination 
206: Voting Rights and Issues 
207: Freedom of Speech & Religion 
208: Right to Privacy and Access to Government Information 
209: Anti-Government Activities 
299: Other 
 
502: Employment Training and Workforce Development 
503: Employee Benefits 
530: Immigration and Refugee Issues 
 
603: Education of Underprivileged Students 
 
1208: Family Issues 
 
13. Social Welfare  
1300: General 
1301: Food Stamps, Food Assistance, and Nutrition Monitoring Programs 
1302: Poverty and Assistance for Low-Income Families 
1303: Elderly Issues and Elderly Assistance Programs (Including Social Security 
Administration) 
1304: Assistance to the Disabled and Handicapped 
1305: Social Services and Volunteer Associations 
1399: Other 
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Table C.1: Resources and Legislative Support (Random Effects Models)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Poor Participants 1.519∗∗∗ 0
(0.551) (.)
Nonwhite Participants 0.523∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.134)
No Organized Interest Group 0.555∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(0.0761) (0.0909)
Extra-Institutional Tactics 0.756∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.116)
Public Salience −1.503∗∗∗ −1.578∗∗∗ −1.557∗∗∗ −1.544∗∗∗ −1.710∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.385) (0.383) (0.457) (0.463)
Education −0.334 −0.255 −0.409 −0.555 −0.530
(0.507) (0.509) (0.511) (0.587) (0.594)
Income 1.264∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗ 1.446∗∗∗ 1.434∗∗∗ 1.229∗∗
(0.438) (0.442) (0.442) (0.511) (0.523)
Percent Black −0.0572 −0.153 −0.0497 −0.423 −0.546
(1.095) (1.101) (1.100) (1.258) (1.272)
Percent Latino −0.433 −0.744 −0.455 −0.0283 −0.522
(1.223) (1.230) (1.229) (1.435) (1.454)
Democratic Representative 0.739∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗ 0.828∗∗
(0.281) (0.282) (0.282) (0.336) (0.341)
Relative Voting Record −0.126 −0.259 −0.0885 0.409 0.346
(0.549) (0.552) (0.551) (0.659) (0.664)
Length of Service 0.535 0.648 0.445 0.723 0.741
(0.495) (0.496) (0.501) (0.575) (0.586)
Incumbent −0.571∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.623∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.169) (0.168) (0.198) (0.202)
Margin of Victory 0.853∗ 0.847 0.990∗ 0.281 0.284
(0.514) (0.515) (0.519) (0.594) (0.601)
Black Representative −0.523 −0.529 −0.550 −0.537 −0.534
(0.442) (0.444) (0.444) (0.508) (0.513)
Latino Representative −0.0707 −0.0675 −0.0584 −0.0819 −0.0399
(0.462) (0.464) (0.465) (0.536) (0.541)
Female Representative 0.614∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.517∗ 0.524∗
(0.235) (0.236) (0.236) (0.272) (0.275)
Southern State 0.123 0.0831 0.192 0.000579 −0.0610
(0.282) (0.283) (0.283) (0.342) (0.344)
Constant −0.387 −0.251 −0.917∗∗ −0.966∗ −1.058∗∗
(0.414) (0.416) (0.424) (0.496) (0.507)
Random Effects Parameter 2.107∗∗∗ 2.131∗∗∗ 2.120∗∗∗ 2.227∗∗∗ 2.243∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.344) (0.342) (0.471) (0.474)
Observations 5497 5497 5481 3709 3693
Groups 257 257 256 212 211
Log likelihood −2785.4 −2778.8 −2754.4 −2075.7 −2039.2
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.2: Resources and Legislative Support (Pooled Regression Models)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Poor Participants 0.340∗∗∗ 0
(0.0781) (.)
Nonwhite Participants 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.0230) (0.121)
No Organized Interest Group 0.110∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0783)
Extra-Institutional Tactics 0.119∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.103)
Public Salience −0.0526 −0.0973∗∗∗ −0.0623∗ −0.381∗∗∗ −1.873∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0373) (0.0356) (0.0439) (0.208)
Education 0.104 0.140∗∗ 0.0935 −0.143∗ −0.591∗
(0.0634) (0.0641) (0.0630) (0.0747) (0.331)
Income −0.166∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗
(0.0577) (0.0585) (0.0577) (0.0715) (0.314)
Percent Black 0.988∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ −0.0176 −0.0797
(0.105) (0.106) (0.104) (0.126) (0.579)
Percent Latino 0.0228 −0.0434 −0.143 −0.343∗∗∗ −2.550∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.110) (0.110) (0.129) (0.594)
Democratic Representative −0.0370 −0.0171 −0.0300 0.103∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0314) (0.0355) (0.195)
Relative Voting Record −0.190∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗
(0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0580) (0.0662) (0.362)
Length of Service 0.529∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 3.796∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0580) (0.0573) (0.0662) (0.354)
Incumbent −0.133∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.583∗∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0337) (0.144)
Margin of Victory 0.213∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ −0.00613 −0.0442
(0.0836) (0.0842) (0.0852) (0.0975) (0.413)
Black Representative −0.326∗∗∗ −0.342∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.0672 −0.181
(0.0418) (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0498) (0.219)
Latino Representative −0.0356 −0.0181 −0.000800 0.155∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗
(0.0495) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0596) (0.257)
Female Representative 0.224∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.0876∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0261) (0.0319) (0.136)
Southern State −0.0378 −0.0507∗ −0.0384 −0.0313 −0.0427
(0.0293) (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0321) (0.148)
Constant 0.476∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ −1.301∗∗∗
(0.0693) (0.0696) (0.0700) (0.0811) (0.356)
Observations 5497 5497 5481 3709 3693
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.3: Resources and Legislative Support (Linear Probability Model)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Poor Participants 0.340∗∗∗ 0
(0.0935) (.)
Nonwhite Participants 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.121)
No Organized Interest Group 0.110∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0783)
Extra-Institutional Tactics 0.119∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.0223) (0.103)
Public Salience −0.0526 −0.0973∗∗∗ −0.0623∗ −0.381∗∗∗ −1.873∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0354) (0.0336) (0.0411) (0.208)
Education 0.104∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.0935 −0.143∗∗ −0.591∗
(0.0606) (0.0611) (0.0605) (0.0700) (0.331)
Income −0.166∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗
(0.0547) (0.0554) (0.0545) (0.0663) (0.314)
Percent Black 0.988∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ −0.0176 −0.0797
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.123) (0.579)
Percent Latino 0.0228 −0.0434 −0.143 −0.343∗∗∗ −2.550∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.105) (0.106) (0.125) (0.594)
Democratic Representative −0.0370 −0.0171 −0.0300 0.103∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0331) (0.0327) (0.0380) (0.195)
Relative Voting Record −0.190∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗
(0.0593) (0.0596) (0.0592) (0.0709) (0.362)
Length of Service 0.529∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 3.796∗∗∗
(0.0578) (0.0587) (0.0580) (0.0682) (0.354)
Incumbent −0.133∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.583∗∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0307) (0.144)
Margin of Victory 0.213∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ −0.00613 −0.0442
(0.0772) (0.0772) (0.0774) (0.0900) (0.413)
Black Representative −0.326∗∗∗ −0.342∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.0672 −0.181
(0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0474) (0.219)
Latino Representative −0.0356 −0.0181 −0.000800 0.155∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0466) (0.0464) (0.0555) (0.257)
Female Representative 0.224∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.0876∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0293) (0.136)
Southern State −0.0378 −0.0507∗ −0.0384 −0.0313 −0.0427
(0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0269) (0.0316) (0.148)
Constant 0.476∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ −1.301∗∗∗
(0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0647) (0.0764) (0.356)
Observations 5497 5497 5481 3709 3693
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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There may be concern that specific issue areas should be accounted for in the model speci-
fication. Within the Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties Policy Agenda’s Project major
topic classification, there are a multitude of subtopic issues including discrimination, voting issues,
and first amendment rights (see Appendix B). Specific issue areas are associated with legislative
support, independent of the resource levels of the participants. That relationship changes when con-
sidering the resource level of participants. Welfare becomes a different issue when associated with
black constituents than when associated with white constituents (Gilens, 2000). Indeed, I argue
that the way that legislators perceive and respond to an issue is conditional on who is asking. So,
empirically controlling for specific issue areas removes some of the variation in legislative respon-
siveness that is due to the costliness and salience of an issue for groups of disparate resource levels.
Notwithstanding, I display the results of the fixed effects models with issue areas clustered standard
errors in Table C.4.
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Table C.4: Resources and Legislative Support (Fixed Effects Model with Issue Area
Clustered SE)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Poor Participants 1.514∗ 0
(0.792) (.)
Nonwhite Participants 0.538∗ 0.633
(0.322) (0.432)
No Organized Interest Group 0.562∗ 0.513
(0.309) (0.375)
Extra-Institutional Tactics 0.786 0.610
(0.515) (0.585)
Public Salience −2.614∗∗∗ −2.605∗∗∗ −2.452∗∗ −1.388∗∗∗ −1.249∗∗∗
(1.004) (0.954) (1.039) (0.375) (0.468)
Education −0.282 −0.269 −0.440 −1.151 −1.304
(1.364) (1.340) (1.385) (1.102) (1.086)
Income 1.697 1.455 1.912 2.064 1.904
(1.724) (1.660) (1.753) (1.735) (1.617)
Percent Black −2.044 −2.110 −1.867 −1.852 −1.866
(1.327) (1.388) (1.283) (1.369) (1.289)
Percent Latino −0.399 −0.866 −0.213 −1.666 −2.230∗
(0.979) (0.859) (0.951) (1.146) (1.148)
Democratic Representative 1.126∗∗ 1.201∗∗ 1.078∗∗ 0.897∗ 0.966∗∗
(0.503) (0.469) (0.520) (0.485) (0.491)
Relative Voting Record −0.907 −0.987 −0.731 −0.0331 0.0690
(1.402) (1.399) (1.468) (0.996) (1.092)
Length of Service 0.348 0.445 0.200 −0.165 −0.266
(0.761) (0.772) (0.791) (0.718) (0.738)
Incumbent −0.631 −0.715 −0.602 −0.533 −0.595
(0.473) (0.478) (0.463) (0.561) (0.591)
Margin of Victory 0.984∗ 0.943 1.044∗ 0.510 0.433
(0.563) (0.582) (0.587) (0.671) (0.761)
Black Representative 0.0882 0.0811 −0.000204 0.132 0.0955
(0.350) (0.353) (0.333) (0.498) (0.485)
Latino Representative 0.277 0.290 0.189 0.419 0.394
(0.437) (0.410) (0.457) (0.601) (0.595)
Female Representative 0.343 0.357 0.351 0.313 0.335
(0.397) (0.382) (0.389) (0.510) (0.478)
Southern State −4.240∗∗∗ −4.361∗∗∗ −3.865∗∗∗ −1.211 −1.666
(0.564) (0.528) (0.671) (1.680) (1.944)
Constant −0.721 −0.421 −1.189 −0.682 −0.527
(1.016) (0.980) (1.118) (1.091) (1.185)
Congressional District Dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 4855 4855 4840 3073 3058
Log likelihood −2499.2 −2492.5 −2469.7 −1838.9 −1804.0
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.5: Resources and Legislative Support (Without MPR Public Salience Mea-
sure)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Poor Participants 1.521∗∗∗ 0
(0.551) (.)
Nonwhite Participants 0.544∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.138)
No Organized Interest Group 0.576∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(0.0780) (0.0936)
Extra-Institutional Tactics 0.785∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.120)
Education −1.194∗ −1.175∗ −1.302∗∗ −1.599∗∗ −1.708∗∗
(0.622) (0.624) (0.627) (0.725) (0.735)
Income 1.877∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗ 2.082∗∗∗ 2.126∗∗∗ 1.958∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.546) (0.545) (0.642) (0.656)
Percent Black −0.444 −0.507 −0.349 −0.991 −1.076
(1.444) (1.452) (1.454) (1.686) (1.713)
Percent Latino 0.0669 −0.406 0.235 −1.421 −1.999
(1.832) (1.842) (1.844) (2.142) (2.179)
Democratic Representative 0.445 0.521 0.441 0.530 0.639
(0.352) (0.354) (0.355) (0.424) (0.431)
Relative Voting Record 0.0919 0.0103 0.217 0.474 0.527
(0.730) (0.734) (0.734) (0.886) (0.896)
Length of Service −0.328 −0.223 −0.447 −0.522 −0.596
(0.610) (0.612) (0.620) (0.707) (0.725)
Incumbent −0.553∗∗∗ −0.637∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗ −0.529∗∗
(0.189) (0.191) (0.191) (0.224) (0.229)
Margin of Victory 0.516 0.478 0.606 0.270 0.219
(0.607) (0.608) (0.612) (0.699) (0.709)
Black Representative −0.436 −0.445 −0.503 −0.135 −0.152
(0.603) (0.606) (0.607) (0.705) (0.716)
Latino Representative −0.389 −0.374 −0.445 0.0937 0.0951
(0.629) (0.631) (0.633) (0.733) (0.743)
Female Representative 0.174 0.191 0.196 0.231 0.265
(0.312) (0.314) (0.314) (0.369) (0.375)
Southern State −4.378∗∗ −4.498∗∗ −3.985∗∗ −1.220 −1.671
(1.763) (1.763) (1.776) (1.873) (1.871)
Constant −0.360 −0.0648 −0.860 −0.520 −0.387
(1.550) (1.552) (1.568) (1.623) (1.609)
Congressional District Dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 4855 4855 4840 3073 3058
Log likelihood −2509.9 −2503.0 −2479.0 −1840.6 −1805.3
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1. All independent variables are coded 0 to 1.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.6: Legislative Support and Electoral Margin of Victory (60% Cutpoint)
Small Margin of Victory (Winning by 50-60%)
Large Margin of Victory (Winning by more than 60%)
Black Participants 0.666∗∗∗
(0.152)
Small Margin of Victory 0.548∗∗
(0.278)
Black Participants X Small Margin of Victory −0.119
(0.298)
Public Salience −2.262∗∗∗
(0.648)
Education −0.577
(0.717)
Income 1.286∗∗
(0.596)
Percent Black −2.410
(1.583)
Percent Latino −0.137
(1.957)
Democratic Representative 0.998∗∗
(0.420)
Relative Voting Record −0.619
(0.854)
Length of Service 0.315
(0.662)
Incumbent −0.540∗∗∗
(0.206)
Margin of Victory 1.834∗∗
(0.866)
Black Representative −0.0263
(0.648)
Latino Representative 0.0827
(0.683)
Female Representative 0.155
(0.332)
Southern State −4.508∗∗
(1.768)
Constant −1.352
(1.652)
Congressional District Dummies Y es
Observations 4383
Log likelihood −2362.1
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.7: Legislative Support and Electoral Margin of Victory (65% Cutpoint)
Small Margin of Victory (Winning by 50-65%)
Large Margin of Victory (Winning by more than 65%)
Black Participants 0.319∗
(0.163)
Small Margin of Victory 0.0521
(0.282)
Black Participants X Small Margin of Victory 0.829∗∗∗
(0.274)
Public Salience −2.391∗∗∗
(0.639)
Education −0.262
(0.714)
Income 1.341∗∗
(0.611)
Percent Black −2.231
(1.600)
Percent Latino −0.433
(1.970)
Democratic Representative 1.095∗∗∗
(0.417)
Relative Voting Record −0.852
(0.856)
Length of Service 0.330
(0.672)
Incumbent −0.569∗∗∗
(0.211)
Margin of Victory 1.012
(0.951)
Black Representative 0.110
(0.649)
Latino Representative 0.285
(0.690)
Female Representative 0.222
(0.333)
Southern State −4.351∗∗
(1.768)
Constant −0.627
(1.713)
Congressional District Dummies Y es
Observations 4383
Log likelihood −2358.8
The dependent variable, legislative support, is binary taking on a value of 0 or 1.
Coefficients are Log Odds.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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